

THE CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY DA -- EXPLANATION

This is the China-India Rivalry Disadvantage. Pages 2 through 5 of this file should be read during the 1st Negative Constructive. A disadvantage or “DA” is called an off-case argument, meaning it does not deal directly with the inherency, harms or solvency observations of the 1st Affirmative Constructive. In fact, the DA derives its link directly from the Affirmative’s plan. The DA links, or is relevant to the Affirmative plan, based on what the affirmative plan does, or the potential consequences the plan may have.

A DA consists of the following:

- Uniqueness – this explains the current state of affairs as it relates to the DA. In this case, the Uniqueness sub-point explains that President Obama has created balance in the relationship between India, China and the U.S., but that stability is fragile in the status quo.
- Link – This explains the way the Affirmative’s plan changes the status quo, or affects the DA’s Uniqueness. In this DA, the Link says that the plan’s proposed changes to space exploration would ignite a rivalry between China and India.
- Internal Link – This adds another dimension of explanation to the Link evidence, and is the bridge between the Link and the Impact. The Internal Link to this DA says that China and India care very much about space programs, and believe them to be critical to their ever-growing militaries.
- Impact – The Impact to a DA explains what will happen if the plan is passed. In this case, if the plan happens, it would upset the stability President Obama has built with China and India. This would lead to a conflict, which would go nuclear, because both China and India have nuclear technology. A nuclear war would lead to extinction or the end of all life on earth.

CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY - 1NC SHELL

A. UNIQUENESS. U.S. TIES WITH INDIA ARE STABLE IN THE STATUS QUO. PRESIDENT OBAMA HAS CREATED BALANCE THROUGH DIPLOMACY. THE RIVALRY IS STABLE NOW.

Ajaya Kumar Das, Senior Analyst, Rajaratnam Sch. of Int'l Studies, November 18, 2010

[<http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/6692>]

Obama's India visit was highly significant. It will not only elevate the bilateral relationship between the United States and India but could also lead to a balancing of China's preponderance in Asia. THE RECENT visit by President Obama to India will undoubtedly take the India-America relationship to an unprecedented level of cooperation and interdependence. Whereas the magnitude of American stake in India's future is high with India as a rising global power, New Delhi finds in the US more than a circumstantial ally. Convergence of interests and values make these two democracies as natural allies. While China will not find this comfortable, it will help bring about an equilibrium in power politics in the Asia-Pacific, bringing peace and stability.

CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY - 1NC SHELL

**B. LINK – THE PLAN PROVOKES THE RIVALRY.
THE PLAN STRENGTHENS U.S. – INDIA TIES IN THE AREA OF SPACE,
DRAMATICALLY WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA. CHINA
FEARS GROWING U.S.-INDIA TIES**

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 16]

The Chinese are increasingly wary over the growing strategic relationship between the United States and India, and Beijing has expressed concern over potential alignments in Asia that could result in the “encirclement” of China. Chinese concern in this regard was made evident when Beijing protested discussions under the Bush Administration to develop a quadrilateral group of like minded democracies in Asia that would include the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. China is also particularly sensitive to India’s influence in Tibet. India allows the Dalai Lama to live in India and has allowed him to visit Tibetans in India’s Arunachal Pradesh state, which borders Tibet. The Indian territory of Ladakh, which is near the Chinese-held, Indian-claimed territory of Aksai Chin, is also ethnically Tibetan. Nonetheless, India is particularly sensitive to the development of U.S.-China relations, especially as they pertain to South Asia. This was evident as India railed at a clause in the 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement which stated that Washington and Beijing will “work together to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in South Asia.”

CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY - 1NC SHELL

C. INTERNAL LINK --

1. CHINA AND INDIA ARE BOTH VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT SPACE-BASED ASSETS

Taylor Dinerman, Senior Editor, Hudson Institute, May 24, 2011

[<http://www.hudson-ny.org/2144/china-vs-india-space-war>]

In the Himalayas, India would have the advantage when flying on its side of the border, and China would have the advantage on its side. Although both nations would naturally seek to train their pilots to fly on the other side of the line, it is hard to see how either side could develop a sustained advantage with an air force that used conventional information systems. If one side could gain an advantage using space-based assets, however, it would gain air superiority and thus win the air campaign, if not the war. If one side, for example, could gather data from space systems to give its pilots a precise awareness of where the enemy aircraft were, while denying such information to the adversary, it could win air superiority.

2. THE UNITED STATES IS THE KEY SPARK: WE WILL TRIGGER A CHINA-INDIA CONFLICT

The Times Online, November 12, 2009

[<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6913250.ece>]

India feels particularly threatened by China's "string of pearls" strategy, building ports in Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan that could be used by its navy. Beijing is concerned that a nuclear deal finalised last year between India and the US, was designed as a counterbalance to China. The deal not only lifted a ban on India buying US nuclear supplies, it also opened the door for India to take part in joint military exercises and buy billions of dollars of US weaponry. "Since 1962, I think Chinese strategists have basically decided that they can deal with India on their own terms," said Evan Feigenbaum of the Council on Foreign Relations, an American research centre. "But when you introduce the United States into that equation, it introduces all kinds of uncertainties. I think we're in for a period of India-China tension."

CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY - 1NC SHELL

C. IMPACT. ANTAGONIZING THE RIVALRY RISKS NUCLEAR WAR.

1. CONVENTIONAL WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA WOULD ESCALATE

Taylor Dinerman, Senior Editor, Hudson Institute, May 24, 2011

[<http://www.hudson-ny.org/2144/china-vs-india-space-war>]

A conventional war fought between these two rivals at very high altitude would superficially resemble the fighting between India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil conflict, when Pakistani infiltrators took control of some mountaintops on terrain claimed by India. Although they were eventually expelled by Indian forces in a month-long campaign fought in some of the most difficult conditions in the history of war, it is likely that a new confrontation here would quickly escalate into something far more intense.

2. EVEN A SMALL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE WOULD MAKE THE PLANET UNINHABITABLE

Columbia Tribune November 7, 2007

[<http://www.columbiatribune.com/2007/Nov/20071107News006.asp>]

Starr (Steven, University of Missouri-Columbia) further explained that a "small, regional" nuclear war, such as that possible between India and Pakistan, could result in the detonation of 100 nuclear bombs the size of those dropped in World War II. The resulting mass fires would, according to some projections, send huge quantities of smoke into the stratosphere that could drop the Earth's temperatures to levels of the pre-industrial age, a time called "the Little Ice Age." Much of the world's farmland would be unusable. "If you launch a successful first strike, but it makes the world uninhabitable, then how successful was it?" Starr asked.

UNIQUENESS EXT. INDIA LINK EXT. (FOR PART A OF THE 1NC SHELL)

U.S. HAS A BALANCED APPROACH FOR INDIA AND CHINA NOW

Aparna Pande, Research Fellow, Hudson Institute, January 29, 2011

[http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7710]

The U.S.-China joint statement of January 19, 2011 while reaffirming the commitment to the 2009 joint statement, does not refer to South Asia, or to India and Pakistan. In the light of President Obama's visit to India in November 2010 some Indian analysts believe there is a subtle message being sent that while the US would like to maintain its close mainly economic relationship with China, the ties with India will be the defining relationship of this century. Is their analysis correct or is it just another case of India aiming to be an equal of a country, China, that is economically and militarily much more powerful. We must not forget that "all politics is local" and the response of the congressmen has a lot to do with the global economic downturn and loss of jobs. Even though the two countries are close population-wise, China is a \$5 trillion economy while India is only a \$1.3 trillion economy. While Sino-Indian bilateral trade stands at \$60 billion, Sino-US bilateral trade will reach \$500 billion by 2015. There are over 3.5 million Chinese Americans, while the Indian American diaspora is around 2 million. What the two Sino-US summits, of 2009 and 2011, have showcased is an acknowledgement of parity from both sides.

U.S. NOT TILTED TOO FAR TOWARD INDIA YET

Raja Mohan, Professor International Studies, Singapore, February 2011

[Lowy Institute, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1505>]

China, in turn, has watched closely the Obama Administration's policy of return to Asia. It has noted Obama's celebration of shared political values with India and cautioned Delhi against building an alliance in the name of democracy, a point emphasised by Chinese editorialists in colourful terms. At the same time, Some Chinese analysts remain confident that Obama's strategic power play with India is not yet strong enough to undermine the centrality of China in the American calculus.

UNIQUENESS EXT. INDIA LINK EXT. (FOR PART A OF THE 1NC SHELL)

**THE U.S. AND INDIA HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO ENCIRCLE CHINA YET
Raja Mohan, Professor International Studies, Singapore, February 2011**

[Lowy Institute, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1505>]

As Delhi and Washington inch towards each other, there remains scepticism about the durability of their triangular dynamic involving China. While the rise of Chinese power threatens both Delhi and Washington, neither is in a rush to declare an explicit policy of balancing China, much less containing it. The difficulty of disentangling the US and Chinese economies, along with India's growing economic interdependence with China, pose significant limits on Indo-US strategic manoeuvres against Beijing. In both countries, there are political divisions on how to deal with China's rise and how far to go in strengthening bilateral defence cooperation to constrain Beijing's potential dominance in Asia. Prudence in both establishments propels Delhi and Washington to find ways to manage and even improve relations with Beijing.

INDIA-U.S. TIES WON'T BE GROWING ANY TIME SOON

Karl Inderfurth, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 13, 2011

[<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/getting-on-with-the-zigzag-path/802752/0>]

While President Obama's visit was well received in India, it may also represent the high point for bilateral relations in the near term. The reality is that over the past six months the bilateral relationship has shifted from big initiatives and centrestage to more routine interactions and schedule interruptions. While several summit follow-up meetings have taken place, including visits to India by outgoing Commerce Secretary Gary Locke and, most recently, Homeland Secretary Janet Napolitano, other meetings and policy activities have been pushed back due to the exigencies of both sides. The one initiative that could have provided the next big boost in the relationship — India's tender for 126 new jet fighters — did not. India chose two European entrants as the finalists in this \$10-12 billion competition, a deep disappointment to both the US government and defence industry. This disappointment, however, may have been mitigated a bit this week with reports that the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the purchase of 10 Boeing C-17 cargo aircraft worth \$4.1 billion.

UNIQUENESS EXT. INDIA LINK EXT. (FOR PART B OF THE 1NC SHELL)

U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS ARE ON AUTOPILOT NOW, THEY WILL STAY THE SAME, NOT DRAW ANY CLOSER

Karl Inderfurth, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 13, 2011

[<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/getting-on-with-the-zigzag-path/802752/0>]
Meanwhile, in Washington, the Obama administration is preoccupied with crises in the Middle East and North Africa, ongoing military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, contentious budget battles, and is now beginning to gear up for the presidential election in 2012. This full plate of issues is tinged with frustration within official Washington about India's reluctance to make progress on a range of issues from agricultural cooperation to defence deals. For some, India's abstention on the Libya vote in the UN Security Council compounds the frustration. In the words of one US official, the US is focusing on "strategic continuity" for the coming year, which could be interpreted by some as placing the relationship on autopilot.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS HAVE STABILIZED

Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2011

[Comparative Connections, <http://csis.org/program/comparative-connections>]
High-level contacts between the US and Chinese militaries resumed in January with a visit by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to China. Immediately following his trip, President Hu Jintao traveled to the US for a state visit. The occasion combined informal discussion with all the protocol trappings of a state visit by a leader from an important country. Both countries exerted great efforts to ensure the visit's success, which put the bilateral relationship on more solid footing after a year that was characterized by increased tensions and discord.

INDIA LINK EXT. INDIA LINK EXT. (FOR PART B OF THE 1NC SHELL)

INDIA RESPONDS TO ANY MOVE MADE BY CHINA IN SPACE

Uddipan Mukherjee, Oil Price.Com January 17, 2011

[The Growing Space Rivalry Between China and India, <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Asia/The-Growing-Space-Rivalry-Between-China-and-India.html>]

Any space maneuvering by India, though concealed within the yoke of the socio-economic model, has a security aspect naturally tied to it. And the rationale is provided by the rapid strides made by its northern neighbor, with which India has a persistent border problem. Hence, any move made by the Chinese in space, necessarily has an Indian countermove coming up. For instance, the Chinese have already sent humans to space. They have developed their ICBMs. They are in an enviable position in terms of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) programmes. This forces India all the more by strategic demands, to catapult its space programme to tally with that of Beijing.

INDIA IS VERY SUSPICIOUS OF CHINA

The Economist August 19, 2010

[http://www.economist.com/node/16846256?story_id=16846256&CFID]

India, too, is unnerved. Its humiliation at Chinese hands in a brief war nearly 50 years ago still rankles. A tradition of strategic mistrust of China is deeply ingrained. India sees China as working to undermine it at every level: by pre-empting it in securing supplies of the energy both must import; through manoeuvres to block a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council; and, above all, through friendships with its smaller South Asian neighbours, notably Pakistan. India also notes that China, after decades of setting their border quarrels to one side in the interests of the broader relationship, has in recent years hardened its position on the disputes in Tibet and Kashmir that in 1962 led to war.

INDIA LINK EXT. (FOR PART B OF THE 1NC SHELL)

INDIA DOES NOT TRUST CHINA

Evan Feigenbaum, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011

[The Washington Quarterly, volume 34, number 2 2011 p. 34]

China's growing role in South Asia could create tensions between the United States and India. Bluntly put, the Indian government, media, and public are deeply ambivalent about the rise of Chinese power, and especially about the expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia. Whether or not these Indian threat assessments are accurate, they will bleed into U.S.—India relations because many in New Delhi will look to the United States for support, but fear the United States could yet tilt away from India for example, by working to address global issues bilaterally with China, sidelining New Delhi and working against Indian interests. China's weight has grown over the past five years to the degree that many in India continue to fear a U.S.—China condominium on issues of direct importance to India. This fear has grown much less pronounced as U.S.—China relations have become more fraught since mid-2010.

INDIA HAS SWITCHED TO A MORE MILITARIZED VIEW OF SPACE

Victoria Samson, The Space Review, May 9, 2011

[<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1838/1>]

India's space program has very strong civil roots: it began as a means to assist India in its development and has mainly focused on improving the everyday lives of its citizens. More recently, India has made a dramatic shift in the tone of its space efforts. Lately, the country has adopted a more militarized attitude, as exemplified by statements made by Indian governmental officials and by increased efforts by India to create an indigenous ballistic missile defense program. India's space efforts very well could affect the long-term sustainability of space and merits further attention.

CHINA LINK EXT. INDIA LINK EXT. (FOR PART B OF THE 1NC SHELL)

CHINA IS MAINLY WORRIED ABOUT INDIA IF IT TEAMS UP WITH THE UNITED STATES

The Economist August 19, 2010

[http://www.economist.com/node/16846256?story_id=16846256&CFID]

Autocrats in Beijing are contemptuous of India for its messy, indecisive democracy. But they must see it as a serious long-term rival—especially if it continues to tilt towards America. As recently as the early 1990s, India was as rich, in terms of national income per head. China then hurtled so far ahead that it seemed India could never catch up. But India's long-term prospects now look stronger. While China is about to see its working-age population shrink, India is enjoying the sort of bulge in manpower which brought sustained booms elsewhere in Asia. It is no longer inconceivable that its growth could outpace China's for a considerable time. It has the advantage of democracy—at least as a pressure valve for discontent. And India's army is, in numbers, second only to China's and America's: it has 100,000 soldiers in disputed Arunachal Pradesh (twice as many as America will soon have in Iraq). And because India does not threaten the West, it has powerful friends both on its own merits and as a counterweight to China.

CHINA'S REACTION TO CLOSER U.S.-INDIA TIES MAKES IMPROVED RELATIONS MORE DIFFICULT

Sujit Dutta, professor Mandela Center, Millia University, New Delhi, Spring 2011

[Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011 volume 34, number 2, p. 129]

Specific to relations with India, the desire to drive an ever harder bargain has made dispute resolution an important goal of the 1988, 2003, and 2005 agreements difficult. The existing differences over China's large territorial claims, its sustained support for Pakistan, a regional diplomacy that persistently seeks to counter-balance India, its negative perception of Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, and its refusal to address the Tibetan autonomy issue that has left 150,000 Tibetans in exile in India for the past 50 years not only cast a shadow on ties, but are also producing new frictions. The growing volume of trade and economic ties between the two countries important for the relationship given the political differences has not managed to cope with the string of new diplomatic complexities.

CHINA LINK EXT. (FOR PART B OF THE 1NC SHELL)

CHINA'S SUSPICION OF INDIA'S GROWING TIES WITH THE US MAKE IT MORE HOSTILE

Sujit Dutta, professor Mandela Center, Millia University, New Delhi, Spring 2011

[Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011 volume 34, number 2, p. 130]

India's rise, as well as its changing international status and role, have also affected the tenor of the relationship. During the past decade, the international perception of India has changed, its diplomacy has expanded, and it has forged close ties with all major powers. Its economic, military, and comprehensive power is growing, and its diplomatic status has changed. China has always been deeply sensitive to changing international power equations which have a bearing on bilateral relations and diplomacy. India's rise and its growing ties with leading powers, especially the United States and Japan, appears to have made China uneasy about potential strategic consequences. Ironically, it has had the effect of making China more assertive, rather than accommodating, in its posture toward India.

IMPROVED U.S.-INDIA TIES SPILL OVER INTO RENEWED BORDER TENSIONS

Jabin Jacob, senior research fellow, Inst of Peace and Conflict Studies, Dec. 14, 2010

[<http://carnegie.ru/events/?fa=3188>]

The Chinese have signaled their displeasure or discomfort with the growing closeness in Indo-U.S. relations in a number of ways, Jacob said. For example, there has been increased attention to border incursions by the Chinese military at the Line of Actual Control. While it is unclear whether the actual number of incursions has risen, Indian media coverage of China and Chinese incursions has risen since 2006. He cited, as instigation for the increased Indian attention, the 2006 speech by then Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Yuxi, who stated that the contested territory of Arunachal Pradesh is part of China. Trends in the Indian media have led to the appearance of increasingly aggressive behavior by China, although such activities are most likely not new.

CHINA LINK EXT. (FOR PART B OF THE 1NC SHELL)

CHINA IS INSECURE ABOUT US-INDIA TIES

Sujit Dutta, professor Mandela Center, Millia University, New Delhi, Spring 2011

[Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011 volume 34, number 2, p. 135]

China has been critical of the emerging Indo —U.S. strategic partnership and was against the Indo —U.S. nuclear agreement as well as the NSG decision to grant India special status in nuclear energy-related commerce. It has been reluctant to see India play a larger regional or global role, and is clearly insecure about India's growing bilateral (and trilateral) ties with the United States and Japan.

INTERNAL LINK EXT. LINK EXT. (FOR PART C OF THE 1NC SHELL)

A GAIN FOR EITHER INDIA OR CHINA IS VIEWED BY THE OTHER AS A LOSS
IntelliBriefs, news digest, September 4, 2010

[<http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2010/09/india-china-locked-in-zero-sum.html>]

A detached observer cannot but notice petty petulance that has crept into the Sino-Indian diplomatic intercourse. Need pettiness remain the leitmotif of Sino-Indian relations? Do statesmen not owe it to themselves and the nations they seek to lead and guide to rein in diplomats resorting to small-mindedness? But before that happens, both China and India have to rationalise, and internalise each others' compulsions. The two countries are widely acknowledged as rising powers and yet locked in a pointless zero sum geopolitical game.

CHINA AND INDIA HAVE A RIVALRY WITH MANY FLASHPOINTS
Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, July 13, 2010

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/13/dont_even_think_about_it]

China and India have built up a \$60-billion-per-year trading relationship, and for years they've insisted that they want to work more closely on a variety of fronts. Yet that expressed desire for collaboration co-exists uneasily with a long-running strategic rivalry. Parts of their mutual border remain in dispute. China has long supported Pakistan, India's main enemy, while the Indians have often befriended competitors of the Chinese (be it Moscow or Washington). Lately Beijing has been cultivating relationships among countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean -- including Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka -- to protect the flow of commerce and access to supplies of natural resources. That has the Indians fearing encirclement.

INTERNAL LINK EXT. – SPACE – (FOR PART C OF THE 1NC SHELL)

MAJOR SPACE PROGRAMS FROM ASIAN NATIONS ARE INCREASINGLY MILITARY IN FOCUS

James Clay Moltz, professor national security, Naval Postgraduate Sch., January 2011

[Journal of Contemporary China, Issue 68, pp. 69-87, vol. 20]

In the emerging post-Cold War space environment, Asian countries—among them China, India, Japan, and South Korea—have played an increasingly prominent role. The motives of these countries to date have been different from those of the superpowers, putting a greater emphasis on domestic political aims, commercial and developmental motivations, and regional strategic goals, compared to geo-strategic military competition. Indeed, most of these programs did not begin as military efforts and have had significant histories with an exclusively (or largely) civilian orientation. However, these seemingly favorable factors have begun to change in the past decade, with all of Asia's major players developing significant military space applications, and at least one, China, actual space weapons.

CHINA AND INDIA ARE ENGAGED IN A SPACE-FUELED ARMS RACE

Christian Caryl, Foreign Policy, July 13, 2010

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/13/dont_even_think_about_it]

So what's new? A lot. Concurrent with their rising economic might, China and India have set about modernizing their militaries to lend extra muscle to their growing strategic ambitions -- and given their complicated history, that can't help but spark worries. "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world," noted one U.S. report. "China's ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles." China's Dongfeng long-range missiles boast independently controlled multiple warheads, mobility, and solid fuel (meaning that they can be fired with little notice). That's just one of many areas in which the Chinese have demonstrated their advanced technological capabilities. In January China shot down one of its own satellites with a missile -- once again demonstrating, as it did with a previous test in 2007, that it's well down the path toward a ballistic missile defense system. That test unnerved the Indians, who saw the prospect of Chinese space weapons as a potential threat to the credibility of their own nuclear deterrent. The Indians, meanwhile, have been hard at work on a new generation of long-range missiles of their own. The Agni-5, which is set for a test flight by the end of this year, has a projected range of 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers -- meaning that it would be able to hit even the northernmost of China's cities. The Indians are also conducting sea trials

of their first ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant, which could be ready for deployment within another year or two.

INTERNAL LINK EXT. – SPACE – (FOR PART C OF THE 1NC SHELL)

SPACE PROGRAMS ARE HIGHLY ASSOCIATED WITH NATIONALISM

James Clay Moltz, professor national security, Naval Postgraduate Sch., January 2011

[Journal of Contemporary China, Issue 68, pp. 69-87, vol. 20]

As noted above, rival nations typically cooperate in sensitive fields involving dual-use technologies—such as space—on only a limited scale, at least until relations of trust have been solidified or security concerns in other areas have dissipated. This is particularly the case when there are asymmetries in the capabilities between states in that field and they fear that an overly generous policy could assist in the rise of potential military rivals. Moreover, because of the close relationship between space technologies and missile development, countries have typically guarded these programs very closely and viewed their neighbor's programs with mistrust. Notably, the United States and the old Soviet Union (in contrast to Russia) often opposed the development of space-launch capabilities even by respective allies in Asia, such as South Korea and North Korea, for fear of upsetting the regional balance of power, creating new military uncertainties, and setting unfavorable precedents for dealing later with potential proliferant states. Thus, space power has been, at times, a divisive force even among allies, often increasing political tensions and nationalism.

INTERNAL LINK EXT. LINK EXT. (FOR PART C OF THE 1NC SHELL)

SPACE ADVANTAGES ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN POSSIBLE CHINA-INDIA CONFLICT

Taylor Dinerman, Senior Editor, Hudson Institute, May 24, 2011

[<http://www.hudson-ny.org/2144/china-vs-india-space-war>]

Never before have two modern military powers -- China and India -- confronted one another across a mountain range like the Himalayas. The wars fought by Europeans across the Alps and Pyrenees would appear as minor skirmishes compared to it. Control of the high ground has always been helpful in war, but now -- when controlling the high ground means better radar coverage, better intelligence gathering capability and better communications -- it is of supreme importance.

SPACE PROGRAMS WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN FUTURE CHINA-INDIA WAR

Taylor Dinerman, Senior Editor, Hudson Institute, May 24, 2011

[<http://www.hudson-ny.org/2144/china-vs-india-space-war>]

The extreme difficulty of resupplying ground forces fighting among the highest mountains in the world, for example, would rapidly make air superiority even more decisive than usual. Namely, for airpower and for modern precision weaponry to be fully effective, it must be supported by spacepower. Satellite navigation systems, such as America's GPSs, are essential, as are satellite communications, space-based reconnaissance and early warning systems. In the mountains, space systems are even more important than in level terrain because of the extreme difficulties of operating multiple fixed and mobile transmitters at high altitude. The limits of normal tactical radios at high altitude have become obvious to American forces operating in Afghanistan; in the Himalayas, the problems would be even worse due to the fact that the peaks are higher and the valleys deeper, making it is all too easy for a ground unit, or even an aircraft, to move into a communications dead zone.

INTERNAL LINK EXT. – SPACE – (FOR PART C OF THE 1NC SHELL)

CHINA AND INDIA ARE ENGAGED IN A SPACE RACE FOR INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE

Newsweek September 19, 2008

[<http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/19/the-real-space-race-is-in-asia.html>]

China sees its spacewalk as a way of proving that it belongs with the United States and Russia in the top tier of space-faring nations. But its true opponent in this space race is not the West so much as its Asian neighbors—India in particular. India has in recent years transformed its space program from a utilitarian affair of meteorological and communications satellites into a hyperactive project that seems designed to make a splash on the world stage. Its robotic-exploration program is scheduled to launch a probe on Oct. 22 that will orbit the moon for two years. And Japan is considering expanding its well-established (if less ambitious) space program—which includes research on the International Space Station and a respectable commercial satellite business—and exploring military applications. Against this backdrop, Beijing's dominance is not unshakable. Just as the Soviet Union's launch of its Sputnik satellite back in 1957 was only a fleeting victory, China's recent accomplishments have provided merely the opening salvos in a modern-day Asian space race. The two biggest forces driving the race between China and India are their insistence on self-reliance and the idea that space exploration feeds national prestige.

CHINA AND INDIA ARE COMPETING IN THE SPACE ARENA

Newsweek September 19, 2008

[<http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/19/the-real-space-race-is-in-asia.html>]

The United States and the Soviet Union were racing in the context of a cold war, but India and China are vying for leadership in a competitive marketplace of people and knowledge industries. It's about developing technology, talent and markets. All of which has stimulated Chinese technology: sensors built for space have ended up in GPS systems, washing machines and other products. The Chinese hope to spin out their rockets and orbiters into inventions and products they can patent. And "they're now right up in the world class of robotics," says British scientist Martin Sweeting, CEO of Surrey Satellite Technology, which built Beijing a pollution-monitoring satellite for the Olympics and does work on China's moon rovers.

INTERNAL LINK EXT. – SPACE – (FOR PART C OF THE 1NC SHELL)

INDIA AND CHINA ARE COMPETING OVER INCREASINGLY AMBITIOUS SPACE POLICY GOALS

Newsweek September 19, 2008

[<http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/19/the-real-space-race-is-in-asia.html>]

The repercussions of China's program were felt most strongly in Delhi, where the 36-year-old space program is now ramping up its moon project at launch speed. China first sent a man into space in 2003, and India won't achieve that goal until 2015, but according to unofficial schedules, China will beat India to a moon landing by only a year. Reaching the moon is the childhood dream of Madhavan Nair, chairman of India's space program, which is now spending about \$1 billion per year, compared with an estimated \$2.5 billion a year in China. If all goes well, at the end of October India will launch the \$100 million Chandrayaan-I, its first lunar orbiter, using the workhorse Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle. The orbiter will fire a probe at the moon's surface, kicking up a cloud of lunar dust that scientists will analyze from afar—and it will plant the Indian flag in lunar soil. Its successor, Chandrayaan-II, a cooperative effort with Russia (and, therefore, one looked down upon by Chinese analysts), is expected to land a rover on the moon by 2012. The space agency, if it can persuade Parliament to fund all its dreams, aims to put a man on the moon by 2020, followed by robotic missions to Mars, a nearby asteroid and the sun—an agenda even more ambitious than China's.

INDIA AND CHINA ARE INVOLVED IN A COLD WAR SPACE RACE

The Sunday Times (UK) June 20, 2008

[<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4182216.ece>]

The world's two most populous countries — and biggest emerging economies — have fought one war on land and are rapidly modernising their air, naval and nuclear forces in case of another. Now India and China are taking their rivalry into orbit, with Delhi determined to catch up with Beijing in what is starting to look like an Asian version of the Cold War “space race”. General Deepak Kapoor, India's Chief of Army Staff, has spoken publicly for the first time of his fears about China's military space programme and the need for India to accelerate its own. “The Chinese space programme is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive content,” he told a conference attended by India's military top brass this week. “The Indian Army's agenda for exploitation of space will have to evolve dynamically. It should be our endeavour to optimise space applications for military purposes.” Describing space as “the ultimate high ground”, he called for the establishment of an interservices space

command to supervise surveillance, reconnaissance and rapid response. It was a rare example of a top Indian official — military or civilian — speaking openly about India's usually secret military space programme and about its strategic rivalry with China.

IMPACT EXT. (FOR PART D, #1 OF THE 1NC SHELL)

THE RIVALRY COULD SPIN OUT OF CONTROL

The Times Online, November 12, 2009

[<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6913250.ece>]

The plan is also being seen as the latest move in a low-level, but escalating struggle for economic and military supremacy between Asia's two emerging giants. This week the flashpoint is their disputed Himalayan border, as China protests over the Dalai Lama's visit to a northeastern Indian state that it claims. But they are also competing over naval control of the Indian Ocean, resources and markets in Africa, strategic footholds in Asia — and are even in a race for the Moon. "It doesn't have the same proportions as the Cold War," said Alexander Neill, head of the Asia programme at the Royal United Services Institute, a research centre. "But there is potential for this to spiral out of control. Allies of both countries need to think carefully about the consequences of this rivalry."

A BORDER WAR COULD ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR

Eric Margolis, veteran journalist, author, Pakistan Defence, 2010

[<http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-forum/70996-china-india-war-giants.html>]

Tibet controls most of the headwaters of India's great rivers. Delhi has long feared that China may one day dam and divert their waters to China's dry western provinces. Other serious potential flashpoints exist. India's old foe, Pakistan, with whom it has fought four wars, is China's closet ally. Beijing arms Pakistan and has built up its nuclear arms program. An Indian-Pakistan war over divided Kashmir, or an Indian intervention in a fragmenting Pakistan or Afghanistan, could draw China into the fray. A new port in western Pakistan at Gwadar will give China port rights on the Arabian Sea. Burma (today Myanmar), on India's troubled eastern flank, which is rent by tribal uprisings, deeply worries Delhi. Strategic Burma is rapidly becoming an important forward Chinese base. A new road links China with Burma, and provides China's navy a badly needed port on the Andaman Sea, and thus access to the Indian Ocean. India believes China is trying to strategically encircle it. To the west, Pakistan; to the north, Tibet; to the east, Burma. To the south, China is busy cultivating Sri Lanka. In spite of million man armed forces and nuclear weapons, India feels increasingly threatened by China's rise. The Indians know full well that China expects obedience from its neighbors. Even a small border clash between these two assertive giants could light the fuse of a broad and very frightening conflict.

IMPACT EXT. (FOR PART D, #1 OF THE 1NC SHELL)

HIGH RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR IN ASIA

Christopher Twomey, Asst Prof National Security, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011

[Asia Policy, Number 11, January 2011 p. 52]

Ongoing changes in traditional state-to-state nuclear dynamics are reshaping international security in Asia. Today, Asia is a multipolar nuclear environment in which long-range nuclear weapons are joined by other systems with strategic effect, and in which countries hold different views about the role and utility of nuclear weapons. This article discusses the implications of these shifts from the Cold War to the present for several guises of stability, on the one hand, and for competition and conflict, on the other. Though each of these considerations leads to dangerous outcomes in isolation, their combined effect is even more deleterious. The implications of this analysis are deeply pessimistic, both for peace in general and for U.S. national security interests in particular.

DECLINING RELATIONS COULD UPSET STABILITY IN ASIA

Sujit Dutta, professor Mandela Center, Millia University, New Delhi, Spring 2011

[Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011 volume 34, number 2, p. 142]

The power of Asia's two largest countries is undergoing gradual but fundamental change. Without a strong structure of cooperation and understanding in place, unsettled disputes between China and India could get out of hand and seriously destabilize Asia. The emerging Asia faces many opportunities for peaceful development. The uncertainties are not as acute and unpredictable as the uncertainties and conflicts Europe faced when it was rising through the 19th and 20th centuries. The gains from growing cross-border trade and investment, the industrial and market networks across the region, and the involvement of international and regional companies in widening regional networks act as brakes against war. Nonetheless, the challenges to peace and stability are serious enough and need to be addressed by the two states in a constructive manner if they are not to repeat the mistakes of the European powers.

IMPACT EXT. (FOR PART D, #2 OF THE 1NC SHELL)

EVEN A LIMITED NUCLEAR EXCHANGE WOULD MAKE THE PLANET UNINHABITABLE

Michael Graham Richard, Treehugger.Com 1.19.10

[<http://www.treehugger.com/files/2010/01/nuclear-winter-easier-to-trigger-than-previously-thought-study.php>]

According to a study titled Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict: Department of Environmental Sciences from Rutgers University, "A minor nuclear war with each country using 50 Hiroshima-sized atom bombs as airbursts on urban areas, could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history [...] New climate model simulations [...] show that the smoke would be lofted by solar heating to the upper stratosphere, where it would remain for years." Even the smallest nuclear exchanges modeled show a plunge in temperatures that would be bigger than the Little Ice Age (approximately 1600-1850), but unlike other climate change events, the effects of a nuclear winter would be felt almost immediately (if the sun doesn't reach the ground anymore, it won't take long for temps to drop significantly).

NUCLEAR WINTER EVEN EASIER TO TRIGGER THAN WE THOUGHT

Michael Graham Richard, Treehugger.Com 1.19.10

[<http://www.treehugger.com/files/2010/01/nuclear-winter-easier-to-trigger-than-previously-thought-study.php>]

George Mason University economist Robin Hanson asks this question over at Overcoming Bias: "So, the first news about nuclear winter was shocking enough to induce cold war adversaries to agree to big cuts. Today we know the situation is even worse - not only is nuclear winter easier than we thought to trigger, but more nations now have big enough arsenals to trigger it.

IMPACT EXT. (FOR PART D, #2 OF THE 1NC SHELL)

NEW COMPUTER MODELS CONFIRM NUCLEAR WINTER – HIGHER RISK THAN WE THOUGHT

Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, Scientific American, January 2010 p.74-81

[Scientific American, January 2010, pp. 74-81]

By deploying modern computers and modern climate models, the two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our calculations the oceans and the entire atmosphere--also only now possible--we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heated and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth.

REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR EVEN BY SMALL PERCENTAGES IS CRUCIAL

Michael Graham Richard, Treehugger.Com 1.19.10

[<http://www.treehugger.com/files/2010/01/nuclear-winter-easier-to-trigger-than-previously-thought-study.php>]

Not that we needed more reasons, but this should help motivate everybody for more nuclear disarmament. It's folly to let the future of billions of people and whole ecosystems depend on a few people who control nuclear weapons (and the number of countries that have nukes has only gone up over time). We might think that a nuclear war can't happen, but history has shown us more than once that it almost did. Now North-Korea claims to have nukes, Iran might them soon, Pakistan has them and isn't the most stable country, Israel has nukes and the US and Russian still have tons of them (and who knows how stable those countries will be in 10-20 years?). I really can't stress enough how important diminishing the risk of nuclear war is, even if by only a few percents (any difference in such a high impact event has a very high expected utility).

Impact Ext. – Kashmir Add-on (This s an Additional Impact for the Negative Team)

A. INDIA-CHINA TENSIONS MAY PLAY OUT IN KASHMIR

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 17]

Many commentators are even speculating that a new “Great Game” is unfolding between India and China, perhaps to be centered on Kashmir. Some analysts see Beijing’s Kashmir stance becoming more adversarial, as was the case in the past, perhaps even more hostile to India than is Islamabad’s.

B. WAR OVER KASHMIR RISKS EXTINCTION

Fai, Executive Director, Kashmiri-American Council, 2001

[Ghulam, 7.8.2001, The Most Dangerous Place, The Washington Times, 2001 p.l/n]

“The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe.”

2NC/1NR ANSWER TO: WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA IS IMPOSSIBLE

CHINESE AND INDIAN MILITARY LEADERS ARE PLANNING FOR WAR

Taylor Dinerman, Senior Editor, Hudson Institute, May 24, 2011

[<http://www.hudson-ny.org/2144/china-vs-india-space-war>]

India and China have been nervously eyeing one another for decades. Although neither of them has a rational reason to go to war with the other, strategists and political leaders in New Delhi and Beijing are making plans, building military roads and airbases, and thinking hard about what would happen if fighting were to break out somewhere along their disputed border. China has the world's second largest economy, India is ranked fourth. While India's economy may take a while to reach the size of China's, its population may overtake China's within a decade or two. In spite of the understandable refusal by both governments to make it official, the rivalry between them is already shaping the geopolitics of the 21st century. The geographic context of their confrontation is unique. In October 1962, China and India fought a month-long war in the Himalayas over the disputed border there. The war ended with a Chinese military victory. Since then, that border has been quiet, but China's support for Pakistan, as well as its global ambitions, make both countries increasingly uncomfortable neighbors for India.

**2NC/1NR ANSWER TO: WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA IS IMPOSSIBLE –
TRADE TIES DO NOT PREVENT WAR**

GROWING TRADE TIES JUST ANOTHER SOURCE OF TENSION

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 17]

In the view of some commentators, the increased interdependence of growing bilateral trade will act as an inhibitor to conflict. Yet, for others, the workings of this dynamic are not so clear. Some analysts also note that the nature and imbalance of the dramatically growing trade between India and China is leading to a degree of antagonism in India toward China over the trade relationship.

INCREASED COMMERCIAL TIES DO NOT PREVENT RISING TENSIONS

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 15-16]

Tensions between India and China appear to be increasing despite a 30-fold jump in the value of their bilateral trade over the past decade. Some analysts now take the view that the bilateral relationship “has begun to take the form of a true geopolitical rivalry.”⁷⁷ China’s decision to issue special visas to Indian citizens from India’s Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir indicates China’s position that residents of these states have different status than other Indians, a position that obviously would antagonize India.⁷⁸ In 2009, India added two full army divisions to those already deployed near the disputed border, built at least three new airstrips in the region, and moved two squadrons of advanced Sukhoi-30 MKI combat aircraft to a base in the nearby Assam state.⁷⁹ The latter months of 2009 saw New Delhi and Beijing engage increasingly vituperative diplomatic and media barbs, placing U.S. officials in something of a dilemma over how to maintain friendly relations with both countries.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, the unresolved border dispute is seen to be a significant obstacle to expanded India-China economic and trade relations.

2NC/1NR ANSWER TO: RELATIONS ARE GOOD NOW

RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA REMAIN STRAINED

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 14]

India and China fought a brief but intense border war in 1962 that left China in control of large swaths of territory still claimed by India. Today, India accuses China of illegitimately occupying nearly 15,000 square miles of Indian territory in Kashmir (the Aksai Chin region), while China lays claim to 35,000 square miles in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The 1962 clash ended a previously friendly relationship between the two leaders of the Cold War “nonaligned movement” and left many Indians feeling shocked and betrayed. While some aspects of India-China relations, including bilateral trade, have warmed measurably in recent years, the two countries have yet to reach a final boundary agreement. Adding to New Delhi’s sense of insecurity have been suspicions regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South and Southeast Asia. A strategic orientation focused on China appears to have affected the course and scope of New Delhi’s own nuclear weapons, ballistic missile, and other power projection programs.

AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS SECTION

2AC ANSWERS TO THE CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY DA

1. NON-UNIQUE: DESPITE RIVALRY, THERE IS MUCH COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 15]

Despite the anxieties elicited by the now simultaneous rise of Asia's two largest countries, New Delhi calls its relationship with Beijing a "priority" and asserts that the two countries have continued to maintain "healthy momentum" in high-level exchanges, including efforts to build military-to-military trust and confidence that are "proceeding satisfactorily." It also notes ongoing bilateral cooperation in areas such as finance, agriculture, water resources, energy, environment, tourism, and information technology, along with joint efforts in multilateral fora on global issues such as trade negotiations and energy security, which includes "cooperating very closely" on climate change issues. Both governments have hailed their "strategic and cooperative partnership" which, according to New Delhi, has established important confidence-building measures and broadened people-to-people contacts.

2. NO LINK: ECONOMIC GOALS WILL PREVENT CONFLICT

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. 17]

While there are causes for concern in the India-China relationship, there are also some new areas of convergence between the two states, as was made evident when the two governments closely coordinated their positions in the lead up to the Copenhagen Conference on climate change. The potential for future renewed conflict between India and China warrants a close watch as the correlates of power and strategic architectures evolve in Asia. Yet, while tensions appear to mount, neither country is likely to seek open conflict as both have made economic development their key national priority.

2AC ANSWERS TO THE CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY DA

3. NO INTERNAL LINK: STRONGER U.S.-CHINA TIES BRING BENEFITS TO INDIA

Rupnarayan Das, Senior Fellow, Inst. of Defense Studies and Analysis, February 12, 2011

[ISDA: New Delhi, India, <http://opinionasia.com/node/865>]

It worth remembering that Washington used its leverage to persuade Beijing to secure a waiver for the Indo-US nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in Vienna. Even during the Kargil war where the US stood with India, China maintained its neutrality. These recent events suggest that there can be a strategic convergence of interests at least on some issues between the US, India and China.

4. NON-UNIQUE: THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP IS STABLE AND MATURING FOR NOW - CHINA ISN'T SUSPICIOUS OF EVERY U.S.-INDIA IMPROVEMENT

Rupnarayan Das, Senior Fellow, Inst. of Defense Studies and Analysis, February 12, 2011

[ISDA: New Delhi, India, <http://opinionasia.com/node/865>]

Sinologists attribute the hardening of Beijing's stand towards India to rapidly improving Indo-US relations that impelled Beijing to perceive growing Indo-US relations, if not containment, as a hedge against China. Ever since then, relations have been sliding between the two countries, with irritants like the issue of stapled visas to the Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh compounding matters. Beijing, however, regards the latter as a "technical issue", to be handled appropriately at administrative level. Fortunately, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's personal chemistry with the Chinese leadership particularly with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao whom he had met 11 times in last six years, has ameliorated relations somewhat. His diplomatic finesse in articulating India's foreign policy posture and his delicate handling of India's relationship with both the US and Japan has somewhat bridged Beijing's trust deficit with New Delhi. For example Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in the month of November last year was adroitly managed with the Chinese media restraining from perceiving it as a hedge against China, but as an aspect of India's inclusive diplomatic engagement in a multi-polar world. Similarly, India seems to have managed a fine balancing act in its relations with the US and China. When President Barack Obama visited India in November last year, there was some suspicion and anxiety in Beijing about the intent of the visit. However, the visit was perceived by Beijing more in terms of the economic and political narrative of two countries rather than through the lenses of a security paradigm. The defence contracts between the US and India were viewed

as augmenting job opportunities in the US, not as an arms race against China. Chinese suspicion of an Indo-US strategic partnership seems to be slowly mellowing down, or at the very least revealing a China that is coming to terms with it. Indeed, there seems to be signs of a maturing of the triangular relationship.

2AC ANSWERS TO THE CHINA-INDIA RIVALRY DA

5. NO IMPACT: A STRONGER CHINA FORCES IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

Wall Street Journal June 17, 2011

[<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304319804576389773307031158.html>]

Analysts say the thaw comes at a time when China is taking a stronger role in the region on geopolitical matters, which some say is leading India to adjust its stance. "India has done a climbdown on both issues," said Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. "There's a leadership deficit in India that reflects this supine policy. India is unwilling to take a stand or to stick with it if it takes one."

6. NOT UNIQUE: GROWING U.S.-INDIA TIES ARE INEVITABLE

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. i]

Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" based on shared values and apparently convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement to expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major U.S. arms sales to India are underway. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow; significant two-way investment also flourishes. The influence of a large Indian-American community is reflected in Congress's largest country-specific caucus. More than 100,000 Indian students are attending American universities.

7. NOT UNIQUE – GROWING U.S.-INDIA TIES INEVITABLE

PK Kerr, Alan Kronstadt, Analysts, Congressional Research Service October 27, 2010

[India-U.S. Relations, October 27, 2010, p. i]

President Barack Obama's Administration seeks to build upon the deepened U.S. engagement with India begun by President Bill Clinton in 2000 and expanded upon during much of the past decade under President G.W. Bush. This "U.S.-India 3.0" diplomacy was most recently on display in June 2010, when a U.S.-India Strategic

Dialogue session saw a large delegation of senior India officials visit Washington, D.C., to discuss a broad range of global and bilateral issues.