

**U.S. LEADERSHIP NEGATIVE**

**Inherency**

It is possible to defend President Obama's recent re-organization of NASA. Many experts believe that focusing on flashy targets like Mars or returning to the Moon are really not sustainable enterprises for the space program. Instead, NASA should focus on basic, incremental gains in knowledge and capability in space flight. Many feel that canceling the Constellation project will not slow down space exploration. President Obama's focus on gradual process is more politically sustainable and will ultimately strengthen America's space capability.

Private space companies can jump start effective space exploration and capability, maintaining America's leadership in technology. Private space programs would drive down the cost and create efficiencies that would outperform China's space program. Accidents would not derail the program as investors would surely understand possible risks at the beginning of the venture.

**Harm/Advantage**

Like many other threats, such as Iraq's WMD, the rapid growth of China's space program is often exaggerated. Some American analysts tend to engage in worst-case thinking, which is likely wrong. The motives for biased evaluations are obvious. Strong financial interests in the pockets of U.S. space industry have created incentives for affiliated business and political leaders to exaggerate the threat. They value their own economic and political interests more than the truth. Politicians exaggerate the threat to win pork projects for their district.

China's space program itself is not an unconstrained technological miracle. There have been many problems and its progress has not been rapid. Their human space program has been very cautious, slower than the U.S. program of the 1960s. China has also experienced delays and setbacks in satellite production and operation. Analysts point out that China's space program now is about where the United States was in 1965, about 45 years behind. China's best human space hardware is equivalent to the U.S. Gemini capsule, which even predates Apollo.

Even the scary scenarios spun about China controlling the Moon are subject to hyperbole. The Moon is too far away to have much military value. There would be far more warning of an attack launched from there than from China. And the source would certainly be known. There are also much cheaper ways for China to launch at the United States than a fabulously expensive and difficult Moon program.

Just because China may place greater priority on space does not mean they will succeed. There are many daunting technical challenges. Their focus may be reorienting away from military application to the more logical commercial uses.

There is very little evidence that China is mounting a serious threat to American dominance in the world. China seems pretty happy with the status quo as it allows them to quietly work on their economic development targets. At the same time, China's model is not so attractive that it is winning converts. They will soon face a constraining threat environment of their own, full of terrorists, nearby failed states, a discontented public and possibly even outright regional rivals like India and Japan.

Economic interdependence presents a final check on China's threat to the United States, as China has strong economic self-interest in the economic success of the U.S. If they were to disrupt American prosperity, it would rebound to hurt their own economy severely. Our mismanaged domestic economic policies are more likely to ruin our economy than any foreign threat.

The U.S. still has unmatched primacy around the world. Our military capabilities far surpass that of any other nation and the gap grows enormously each year because of the immense amount we spend on national defense annually. Our ability to influence global events will increasingly come to depend on our soft power, which makes space programs far less relevant.

### **Solvency**

There is no evidence that a stronger U.S. space program would discourage China from continuing with its own. There are many motivations, from commercial, to prestige, to threat perception, that would maintain China's focus on getting to space as best and fast as it can. China has been working on their space program for a long time before President Obama cancelled the Constellation project, so there is no reason to believe the decisions are connected. Chances are pretty good that no hostile American policy could discourage China from space. There is evidence in the Chinese Insecurity file about that.

### **Disadvantages**

Cooperation and accommodation, rather than competition, will be more likely to give us an advantage over our adversaries. Both Russia and China are highly concerned about their own perceived status in the world. If the U.S. challenges that status with an aggressive space program, it will cause encirclement fears and paranoia, which will prevent successful cooperation and leadership. Cooperation is the better path to leadership than is confrontation.

The plan would provoke China's insecurity. They view the U.S. space program as a huge military threat and the affirmative plan would surely escalate that. Their response, in turn, would be to speed up their own space program and shift its focus more to the military side away from commercial. This would increase competition and the risk of miscalculation.

Taking an aggressive posture toward China would likely shift the leadership struggle occurring there in the direction of nationalist, hostile leaders. There currently is a battle going on in China for the future direction of their nation. Some leaders believe China would be better off focusing on domestic goals and continuing their "peaceful rise" foreign policy. Others are more nationalist and perceive a hostile global environment where China has to fight back. The affirmative plan would provide proof of the hostile environment and give legitimacy to the views of the nationalist leaders. If the leadership struggle goes in the wrong direction we would be facing reactionary, dangerous Chinese policies in many areas, not just space exploration.

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The plan would be very expensive which would link to the Spending DA. Space programs are expensive and ones with military applications are just as susceptible to cost overruns as civilian programs.

### **Counterplans**

The evidence in the U.S.-China Cooperation Affirmative could be used to design a counterplan that would address the threat from China in a more constructive and less threatening way.

## **INHERENCY ANSWERS: U.S. SPACE PROGRAM NOT DEAD**

### **INCREMENTAL PROGRESS IS MORE SUSTAINABLE THAN FLASHY SPACE MISSIONS**

**Roger Handberg, professor, Political Science, Univ. Central Florida, January 17, 2011**

[The Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1>]

Projects are the political vehicle for obtaining support for human exploration but, unfortunately, they carry an aura of completeness. Once the Eagle landed on the lunar surface in 1969, the Apollo program was done—subsequent missions were merely running out the string. That reality made it politically easy for President Nixon to pull the plug on the last three Apollo missions. Those missions more heavily emphasized the scientific component, but for the political class, that was at best of marginal importance. A process approach looks something like the Mars exploration effort, where a series of missions are launched, each as a building block for the next and building on past missions. Mission failures occur, but they are not the end of the story. Small ball can be as exciting as the home run approach and much more fundable, especially in a harsh budget environment that will exist for the foreseeable future.

### **FOCUS ON LARGE SCALE AND DRAMATIC SPACE PROGRAMS ARE UNSUSTAINABLE**

**Roger Handberg, professor, Political Science, Univ. Central Florida, January 17, 2011**

[The Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1>]

If one conceptualizes Apollo as the example *par excellence* of the home run approach, what does the small ball approach mean for NASA? Simply put, NASA needs to think of its human space exploration effort as a process, not a project. Apollo arose from the political world rather than the logical outcome from a systematic approach to space exploration. NASA provided the substance but the president, Kennedy, was looking for flashy items to highlight US prestige and technological capabilities. The latter was particularly important since the Soviets were clearly leading the United States in the space race in May 1961. This event, Apollo, with its great success, imprinted itself into NASA's organizational DNA: human spaceflight programs must be large scale and dramatic. That is what needs to change if NASA and its aspirations are to survive.

**INHERENCY ANSWERS: U.S. SPACE PROGRAM NOT DEAD**

**CURRENT POLICIES FOCUS ON A GRADUAL PROCESS, WHICH IS MORE POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE**

**Roger Handberg, professor, Political Science, Univ. Central Florida, January 17, 2011**

[The Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1>]

As has been repeatedly said, Apollo was *sui generis*, one of a kind, a product of unique historical circumstances. NASA's future in human spaceflight is budget wise and politically more supportable as a small ball approach. This is clearly less flashy, but today being politically sustainable must become the focus. The flexible path suggested by the Obama Administration is perceived by some as too vague and indefinite (see "Prognosticating NASA's Future", The Space Review, March 29, 2010). That may be an accurate judgment, but that plan envisions a process rather than a constituency or destination focus, which has been typical of NASA initiatives. Such a project or destination focus becomes finite, with an end date and no logical follow on into the future. Conceptualizing space exploration as a process rather than a destination or project allows you to build on success and push outward beyond the Moon and into the solar system.

**INHERENCY ANSWERS: U.S. SPACE PROGRAM NOT DEAD**

**CANCELING CONSTELLATION WON'T SLOW SPACE EXPLORATION**

**John Matson, Scientific American, February 1, 2011**

[<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nasa-budget-constellation-cancel>]

By scrapping the troubled program—along with its focus on a moon landing—and leaning on the private sector, the agency thinks it will actually accelerate efforts to loft astronauts beyond low Earth orbit, the farthest reach of the shuttle. NASA Deputy Administrator Lori Garver declined to specify a preliminary target for exploration in a teleconference Monday afternoon but mentioned near-Earth asteroids as a potential stepping-stone on the path to ultimately exploring Mars and its moons. She also pointed out that, although the agency will relax its focus on the moon, lunar exploration remains on the table. "We're certainly not canceling our ambitions to explore space," Garver said. "We're canceling Constellation."

**CANCELING CONSTELLATION WILL INCREASE SPACE EXPLORATION**

**John Matson, Scientific American, February 1, 2011**

[<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nasa-budget-constellation-cancel>]

Garver tried to put the new approach in context, calling Constellation's stated goal of a moon landing in 2020 "wishful thinking." By stepping back from that unrealistic timeline, she said, the U.S. would be free to undertake more ambitious exploration. "We had lost the moon," Garver said, "and what this program does is give us back the solar system."

**CONSTELLATION WASN'T GOING TO GET US TO THE MOON**

**John Matson, Scientific American, February 1, 2011**

[<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nasa-budget-constellation-cancel>]

In Monday's teleconference, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden expressed support for the budget request, saying that he was "excited" to present the president's proposal, which would add \$6 billion to NASA's total outlay over the next five years. Bolden said that he and Obama agreed that Constellation was in an untenable position. "The truth is, we were not on a sustainable path to get back to the moon's surface," Bolden said. He applauded the decision to delegate the development of launch capabilities to commercial providers while, he said, "NASA firmly focuses its gaze on the cosmic horizons beyond Earth."

**INHERENCY ANSWERS: U.S. SPACE PROGRAM NOT DEAD**

**CANCELING THE CONSTELLATION MISSION MAKES FOCUS ON MARS MORE EFFECTIVE**

**David Freedman, science and tech journalist for 30 years, December 2010**

[Scientific American December 2010, Vol 303, Issue 6]

The elimination of the moon missions has drawn some fire, but those missions were really just dry runs for the real long-term goal of the exploration program: getting humans to Mars. And in spite of what some foes of the new plan have implied to the public, the plan does not call for NASA to spend less money on space or abandon its longer-term human space exploration plans. Rather the plan implicitly recognizes that a round-trip visit to Mars will require significant technological advances well beyond what Constellation would be likely to provide, and by freeing up NASA from having to spend all its money and expertise on orbital ferrying, the plan gives the agency the breathing room it needs to come up with those and other advances. "The plan represents a lowering of cost and better management of NASA's low-Earth-orbit business, so that it can focus on research and development, Earth science and space science," says Eligar Sadeh, president of Astroconsulting International, a space and defense consultancy in Colorado Springs, and a researcher with the U.S. Air Force Academy's Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies. In fact, the plan calls for NASA budget increases over the next few years. In many ways, the plan is an attempt to return NASA to its 1960s glory days by making it a true research and development agency again, farming out the been-there work of low Earth orbit to civilian contractors. It would make Mars the new moon.

**THE SPACE STATION AND SHUTTLE PROGRAM HAS ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE**

**Gregg Easterbrook, Reuters columnist, April 15, 2010**

[<http://blogs.reuters.com/gregg-easterbrook/2010/04/15/get-over-the-moon-we-need-nasa-to-save-the-earth/>]

Yes, the Apollo moon landings were significant and memorable, but the last one occurred 38 years ago. In recent decades, NASA's record has been spotty. The agency's space science program – probes of the outer planets, telescopes that scan the far heavens – is successful and cost-effective. But for decades manned space flight, which receives the bulk of NASA funds, has accomplished: um, what? More money than was spent for the Apollo moon missions has been invested in the International Space Station, whose primary function is to give the space shuttle a destination. The shuttle, in turn, exists mainly to fly to the space station. The space station has no notable scientific achievements: it is such a white elephant that already NASA is studying the best way to "deorbit" the whole 380-ton structure, meaning allow it to burn in the upper atmosphere. This may happen as soon as 2016.

## **INHERENCY ANSWERS: PRIVATE SPACE PROGRAMS CAN SOLVE**

### **PRIVATE COMPANIES CAN JUMP START EFFECTIVE SPACE EXPLORATION**

**David Freedman, science and tech journalist for 30 years, December 2010**

[Scientific American December 2010, Vol 303, Issue 6]

But just because it is a big bet with real risks does not mean it is a bad bet. There are reasons to believe private companies could quickly rise to the task of getting people to orbit--and do it more cheaply and reliably than any big NASA-run program ever could. And that in turn could open the door to a prize that, thanks to a three-decade-long near stall in human space exploration, most people had almost stopped even dreaming about: a welcome mat above Earth not just for a small corps of astronauts but also for legions of scientists, engineers and even those of us who would simply get a really big kick out of spending a few days or weeks in outer space. Even better, the wave of space visitors could kick-start a self-sustaining orbital economy, one that would establish humanity's place in space, including Mars and beyond, much more firmly than Constellation or any conventional space program ever could.

### **PRIVATIZATION OF SPACE COULD DRIVE COSTS DOWN AND CREATE ECONOMIES OF SCALE**

**David Freedman, science and tech journalist for 30 years, December 2010**

[Scientific American December 2010, Vol 303, Issue 6]

THE BIGGEST POTENTIAL PAYOFF to the Obama plan would be the opportunity to drive the costs of a flight to orbit down low enough to create a virtuous circle: as prices drop, more people will fly, and as more people fly, economies of scale and increased competition will lead to lower prices, and so on. The circle would be reinforced when enough people fly to justify the creation of more infrastructure in orbit--that is, more places to stay and things to do--which would attract more people and lead to more infrastructure. And voilà: we'd have an orbital economy.

**INHERENCY ANSWERS: PRIVATE SPACE PROGRAMS CAN SOLVE**

**AMERICAN PRIVATE SECTOR SPACE WILL OUTPERFORM THE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM**

**Rick Boozer, astrophysics, industrial software engineer, May 19, 2011**

[[http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc\\_ac/8496119\\_united\\_states\\_will\\_beat\\_china\\_in\\_newest\\_space\\_race](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc_ac/8496119_united_states_will_beat_china_in_newest_space_race)]

But the Chinese are glimpsing something that disturbs them. They are worried that the American company SpaceX can launch satellites and people into space for prices so low that the Chinese can't compete with them ! SpaceX is one of the companies NASA is hiring to come up with space vehicles for sending astronauts to the ISS under its Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program. Other CCDev companies include veteran aerospace giant Boeing and newcomers Sierra Nevada Corporation and Blue Origin. Competition between these companies would bring down launch prices allowing NASA to have more money for developing technology we will need to send Americans to the Moon, asteroids, and Mars. However, the money hungry super rocket (that politicians are forcing NASA to build with obsolete and expensive 1980's era shuttle technology) jeopardizes the development of deep space exploration technology by potentially gobbling any money freed up with CCDev. Not relying heavily on subcontractors as its competition does, SpaceX manufactures 80% of its vehicle parts, giving them greater quality control. They use the same rocket engine in all of their launch vehicles. When they want more power, they add more engines to the vehicle, giving them economies of scale. Those are just a couple of the many ways they hold prices down while insuring high quality and safety. That affordability is allowing them to develop the most powerful launcher since the Saturn V moon rocket - totally on their own with no government money! The other companies participating in CCDev also use American ingenuity to bring prices down. In a few years because of their cost savings, more astronauts will be launched into orbit than have ever been before! And if politicians can be prevented from squandering the money freed up by CCDev, Americans will lead the way in exploration throughout the inner solar system with such proposed NASA projects as Nautilus-X at much lower cost than the traditional way of doing things. Nautilus would be the first true spaceship that would stay in space and never land, with astronauts brought to it from Earth by the CCDev vehicles. NASA can accomplish great things without a budget increase. If we have the national will, the U.S. will dominate outer space, not the Chinese!

**INHERENCY ANSWERS: PRIVATE SPACE PROGRAMS CAN SOLVE**

**ACCIDENTS WOULD NOT DISCOURAGE SPACE TOURISM**

**David Freedman, science and tech journalist for 30 years, December 2010**

[Scientific American December 2010, Vol 303, Issue 6]

On the other hand, neither risk nor catastrophe would dissuade a large segment of the potential market, argues Scott Tibbitts, founder of the eSpace Center for Space Entrepreneurship in partnership with the University of Colorado. "Society looks at the risks of adventure tourism favorably," Tibbitts says. "After eight people were killed trying to climb Mount Everest in 1996, sales of Everest expeditions to the public skyrocketed. No one talks about shutting down the skydiving business when a sky-diver is killed. Tolerance for risk in space will increase, especially when prices come down to between \$1 million and \$5 million a seat. At those prices there could be a heck of a lot of people who want to fly as quick as a company can launch them."

**AT: SPACE RACE – CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM IS NO THREAT**

**THE RAPID GROWTH OF CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM IS OFTEN EXAGGERATED**

**Alanna Krolkowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2011**

[Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

International observers and Chinese media often describe China’s civil space program as “soaring” ahead or “leaping” forward. Chinese space professionals familiar with different aspects of the program, however, tend to regard its progress as cautious and unbalanced. They also emphasize that their program is not racing with any other country. Progress has been steady but not necessarily rapid across the main areas of the civil space program, with some exceptions. The pace of launches accelerated recently. In 2010, China for the first time matched the United States in the number of launches in a single year: 15. By contrast, the human spaceflight program, although reaching new milestones since 2003, has proceeded at a cautious pace. Chinese observers note that their country’s crewed launch schedule has been slower than the U.S. Apollo Program’s of the 1960s. China has also experienced recent delays and setbacks in satellite production, including the on-orbit failure in 2008 of a satellite delivered to Nigeria, a launch failure in 2009, and delays in launch-vehicle development.

**CHINA’S THREAT FROM SPACE IS EXAGGERATED – WORST CASE THINKING LIKELY WRONG**

**Bruce MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, May 11, 2011**

[Testimony for the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one-child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come.

## **AT: SPACE RACE – CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM IS NO THREAT**

### **CHINA’S SPACE THREAT IS EXAGGERATED FOR POLITICAL REASONS**

**Rick Boozer, astrophysics, industrial software engineer, May 19, 2011**

[[http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc\\_ac/8496119\\_united\\_states\\_will\\_beat\\_china\\_in\\_newest\\_space\\_race](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc_ac/8496119_united_states_will_beat_china_in_newest_space_race)]

America is laying the groundwork for its greatest space endeavor since sending astronauts to the Moon. But that's not the story you will hear from a few senators and congressional representatives who are more concerned with bringing home pork than significantly advancing U.S. spaceflight prowess. Exaggerating China's future spaceflight plans is one of their favorite strategies. In fact Chinese space ambitions are modest. Their yet-to-be-started space station won't be complete until 2020 at the earliest. It will weigh only 60 tons compared to the International Space Station's 400 tons and less than half the defunct Russian MIR station's 130 tons.

### **POLITICIANS EXAGGERATE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM TO WIN PORK PROJECTS**

**Rick Boozer, astrophysics, industrial software engineer, May 19, 2011**

[[http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc\\_ac/8496119\\_united\\_states\\_will\\_beat\\_china\\_in\\_newest\\_space\\_race](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc_ac/8496119_united_states_will_beat_china_in_newest_space_race)]

China's state news announced they are tentatively considering a gigantic super rocket. It prompted Rep. Frank Wolf of Virginia to say, "The announcement made clear that if the United States does not get serious about its own Exploration Program, the next flag planted on the moon may be a Chinese flag." Even before the announcement, Rep. Bill Posey of Florida made similar dire predictions about future Chinese space accomplishments. However, careful reading of the Chinese article reveals it is a preliminary feasibility study, NOT any actual plan to build the rocket. Furthermore, given that the rocket would carry a 130-ton payload, which is exactly the same payload weight as the super rocket demanded by certain U.S. Senators, the Chinese study is probably just a knee-jerk response to the Senators' efforts.

### **CHINA’S SPACE THREAT IS EXAGGERATED**

**Gregg Easterbrook, Reuters columnist, Aril 15, 2010**

[<http://blogs.reuters.com/gregg-easterbrook/2010/04/15/get-over-the-moon-we-need-nasa-to-save-the-earth/>]

China? The Chinese space program is about where the United States was in 1965; China's best manned-space hardware is equivalent to NASA's obsolete Gemini rocket-capsule stack. If China lands a man on the lunar regolith half a century after the United States reached "been there, done that" status for this objective, it is hard to see how that threatens America – let China be the country to waste a huge chunk of national treasure looking for ice on the Moon! Old-timers from NASA, and pork-barrel proponents such as Rep. Olson, want to depict China's 1960s-vintage space effort as a national threat, because then money will flow without any need to prove the case. If a return-to-the-Moon made sense on its own, proponents would argue on the merits.

## **AT: SPACE RACE – CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM IS NO THREAT**

### **CHINA’S SPACE SUCCESS NOT ASSURED, MANY TECHNICAL CHALLENGES REMAIN**

**Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, May 11, 2011**

[Testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

But China’s recent rise in space does not guarantee its success. China remains behind world standards in a number of critical space technologies, raising questions among partner nations in terms of the quality of its spacecraft. Despite Thailand’s membership in APSCO, for example, Bangkok turned to a European consortium to purchase its Thailand Earth Observation Satellite (THEOS), whose remote-sensing technology is more sophisticated than China’s. Similarly, China had technical problems with its Nigcomsat-1 due to a faulty solar array, causing the spacecraft to cease functioning in 2008. Beijing has had to offer a replacement satellite.

### **CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM IS REORIENTING AWAY FROM A MILITARY FOCUS TO A COMMERCIAL ONE**

**Christopher Mims, Journalist, Washington DC, Fast Company, April 27, 2011**

[<http://www.fastcompany.com/1750093/what-chinas-new-space-station-means-for-china-and-the-world>]

Because its space program is a subsidiary of the People's Liberation Army, some have concluded that China's designs on space are military, but thoughtful observers disagree: the association between the country's space exploration program and the PLA is about the past, not the future. Chinese lasers won't be raining down on us from space any time soon. The future of China's space program is not about weapons, it's about putting a Chinese man on the moon. The thing about China--a nation led by engineers--is that through the vehicle of its 5-year plans, its government methodically pursues its stated goals. It's happened before in microchips, leading the Chinese government to develop a home-grown processor that may some day challenge Intel. And it's happening in space.

## **AT: SPACE RACE – A STATION ON THE MOON IS NO THREAT**

### **THE MOON HAS VERY LITTLE MILITARY VALUE**

**Joe Poppolardo, Popular Mechanics, January 2011**

[[www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/moon-mars/china-moon-military-war-in-space](http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/moon-mars/china-moon-military-war-in-space)]

The idea was straightforward and simple from this magazine editor's standpoint—parlay the buzz about China's lunar ambitions into a conjectural story about the weapons and tactics of a lunar battle. But my "battle for the moon" scenario started to fall apart immediately—mostly because the moon is of such little military utility.

### **THERE ARE MUCH CHEAPER ALTERNATIVES THAN USING THE MOON TO LAUNCH THINGS AT THE EARTH**

**Joe Poppolardo, Popular Mechanics, January 2011**

[[www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/moon-mars/china-moon-military-war-in-space](http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/moon-mars/china-moon-military-war-in-space)]

Any conflict, first of all, needs a motive. So I turned to Robert Heinlein, my favorite classic sci-fi author, whose revolutionary heroes in the novel *The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress* set up a plausible weapons system that flung unstoppable rocks at the Earth from the moon. That may have worked well for a lunar colony that was already established—the Loonies in the book weaponize an electromagnetic mass driver that flings cargo from one lunar destination to another—but it makes a lot more sense for an earthbound government to drop kinetic weapons from low Earth orbit. Called "rods from God" by nerdish wags, the idea is that something dropped from orbit, even without explosives, would demolish anything it impacted. Such an orbital kinetic weapons system is a heck of a lot cheaper than setting up anything on the moon, and it would be just as effective, offering the target less warning. Any nation attacked by a space rock from the moon could see it coming and intercept it, or at least retaliate against the Earth-bound assets.

**AT: CHINA THREAT – CHINA IS NO THREAT TO U.S. LEADERSHIP**

**NO EVIDENCE THAT CHINA IS FUNDAMENTALLY CHALLENGING U.S. PRIMACY**

**Ian Clark, professor of international politics, Aberystwyth Univ. January 2011**

[International Affairs, Vol. 87. Issue 1, p. 22]

This line of argument would be of theoretical interest alone had it not been matched by the substance of Chinese policy. There has, to date, been little evidence of any overt strategy of balancing or soft balancing on China's part. Even in the case of Iraq in 2003, China—while clearly opposed to American military action—challenged the United States less openly than did Russia, Germany and France. In that sense, the opportunity for a practical realization of multipolarity was not seized by China, as it did not wish unduly to antagonize the US. Reportedly, Russian officials were very much disappointed by China's performance over Iraq, and criticized it for being 'half a step behind' the other three countries in their efforts to constrain American-led action. China's policy by the end of this decade may have become more self-confident, and more assertive, but the fundamentals of this assessment do not yet appear to have changed.

**CHINA'S MODEL IS NOT BEING ACCEPTED INTERNATIONALLY – THEY ARE NO THREAT TO U.S. PRIMACY**

**Ian Clark, professor of international politics, Aberystwyth Univ. January 2011**

[International Affairs, Vol. 87. Issue 1, p. 26]

On the international economic front more generally, China's highly visible resource diplomacy evokes widespread misgivings, whether justifiable or not, while its enormous current account surpluses have not yet translated into a commensurate role in international capital and currency markets, given the limitations of its domestic institutions in those areas. In this more complex light, the future respective standings of the US and China evidently depend upon much more than any forward extrapolation of their material capabilities. In the short term, and notwithstanding any power transition currently under way, there is simply no prospect of China acting as a hegemon in its own right. For that reason, the real issue that faces us is not whether China will succeed the United States, but whether it is possible to design an order, broadly acceptable to all, that also satisfies the particular preferences of both China and the United States simultaneously.

**AT: CHINA THREAT – CHINA IS NO THREAT TO U.S. LEADERSHIP**

**PROJECTIONS OF CHINA'S POWER BASED ON THEIR ECONOMIC GAINS EXAGGERATES THEIR THREAT**

**Ian Clark, professor of international politics, Aberystwyth Univ. January 2011**

[International Affairs, Vol. 87. Issue 1, p. 28]

Future projections of material power, in any event, have been notoriously unreliable, as previous predictions of the decline of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s amply demonstrated. Similarly, projections of China's future role, based on simple extrapolations from its current rate of economic growth, are bound to deceive. Above all, China faces a complex array of severe domestic problems that will dominate its policy priorities for many decades to come, and it is wholly speculative to assess the nature of its likely international contributions beyond those concerns.

**THE SCENARIO OF CHINA AND THE U.S. COMPETING FOR PRIMACY IS UNLIKELY TO OCCUR**

**Ian Clark, professor of international politics, Aberystwyth Univ. January 2011**

[International Affairs, Vol. 87. Issue 1, p. 28]

These reflections warn against any temptation to plot future legitimacy dynamics, as if they straightforwardly track material shifts in power. In the literature on China's rise, accounts of so-called hegemonic succession have actually been about no more than an embryonic power transition, and rest upon narrowly materialist accounts. Martin Wight was right to warn against an exclusive focus on the 'mechanics', and to insist that attraction and influence are not 'exactly correlated to mass and weight'. Serious questions are properly being asked about the US capacity to sustain its role in the future. At the same time, there are equally pertinent questions about whether China is yet able to convey an appealing international purpose that, in Wight's words, would support a 'common interest', promote 'real values', and promise 'real benefit' for all. The future positions of these two states will be shaped, not simply by transitions in material power, but just as importantly by the potential to develop an institution of hegemony, resting upon widespread international consent. If this is to be achieved at all, then, in the foreseeable future, it is much more likely to be collective in form than to represent a succession of hegemonies.

## **AT: CHINA THREAT – CHINA IS NO THREAT TO U.S. LEADERSHIP**

### **CHINA'S EMERGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT WILL CONSTRAIN ITS AGGRESSION**

**Ely Ratner, RAND Corporation, National Asia Research Program, 2011**

[The Washington Quarterly volume 34, number 1, Winter 2011 p. 40-1]

Finally, scholars have argued that China's domestic problems environmental, social, demographic, economic, and political will likely retard its meteoric rise.<sup>51</sup> The same could be said of emergent international threats. Those who wish to see the containment of Beijing's expanding influence should consider how international security threats will likely divert and drain its resources and attention. China has managed to free ride on the U.S.-led system without having to pay its dues as a great power, but that window appears to be closing fast. The ruling regime would like to push this date back as far as possible, but at the end of the day, the decision will not be theirs. In this sense, China's rise is most likely a self-limiting process which may not require U.S. sand in its gears to slow it down. The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China's Rise

### **ANALYSTS OF CHINESE "INTENTIONS" EXAGGERATE THE THREAT**

**Ely Ratner, RAND Corporation, National Asia Research Program, 2011**

[The Washington Quarterly volume 34, number 1, Winter 2011 p. 38]

Embedded in these analyses of China's "strategic intent" is the perception that leaders in Beijing have a well-developed national security strategy that will guide its future behavior. This notion further suggests that U.S. analysts should employ some combination of Chinese writings, leadership analyses, intelligence estimates, and diplomatic and military signals to reveal China's intentions. Academic theories of international relations and power transitions have led scholars to adopt similar assumptions, positing China as a willful, proactive rising power that will choose either to assimilate into or to challenge the U.S.-led system. This framework is misconceived, however, insofar as it overstates the causal linkages between China's "strategic intentions" and future behavior. There is any number of reasons to believe that coherent, long-term strategies are not yet in place, and even if they were, would fail to persist over time. Analysts should therefore exercise caution in assuming that the CCP possesses a comprehensive and forward-looking national security strategy.

## **AT: CHINA THREAT – CHINA IS NO THREAT TO U.S. LEADERSHIP**

### **CHINA WILL INEVITABLY FACE A CONSTRAINING THREAT ENVIRONMENT**

**Ely Ratner, RAND Corporation, National Asia Research Program, 2011**

[The Washington Quarterly volume 34, number 1, Winter 2011 p. 36]

Finally, through traditional state-to-state politics, China may also engender adversaries as a result of ultimately being forced to take a stand on internationally contentious issues. Nonalignment is fine in theory, but is increasingly difficult to practice for a permanent member of the UN Security Council with rapidly expanding economic and security interests. Even apolitical economic cooperation with countries such as Cuba, North Korea, or Venezuela can be highly political (and controversial) actions in and of themselves. Similarly, in regions such as the Middle East that are wrought with rivalry and conflict, it will be tremendously challenging for Beijing to simultaneously maintain positive relations with Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. At some point, supporting one regime will mean opposing another. All this is not to predict a widespread phenomenon of anti-Chinese regimes around the world, but it will only take a few to cause major headaches in Beijing. Taken together, China is bound to face an extremely complex future threat environment, to be filled with some combination of terrorists, failed states, discontented publics, and outright adversaries.

### **CHINA'S POWER IS EXAGGERATED**

**Jacques deLisle, director Asia Program, Univ of Pennsylvania, Fall 2010**

[Orbis, Fall 2010 Volume 54, Issue 4, pp. 493-524]

Will China move beyond using soft power primarily for the relatively limited and primarily defensive purpose of allaying concerns about a “China threat” and avoiding balancing or containing reactions? Will it use soft power to more affirmative, transformative ends (as has been characteristic of American uses of soft power)? For the near term, the answer to these questions remains no. In several ways, China’s soft power resources remain relatively weak and lag far behind those which the United States still wields, despite dissipation during the last decade and amid recent and still-uncertain efforts to rebuild. First, the degree to which China has closed the gap is easily over-estimated and frequently overstated. Like China’s hard power, China’s soft power is geographically uneven, appearing weaker, narrower or less securely rooted outside its neighborhood and especially in the West.

**AT: CHINA THREAT – CHINA IS NO THREAT TO U.S. LEADERSHIP**

**CHINA NOT MAKING MEANINGFUL DIPLOMATIC GAINS**

**Jacques deLisle, director Asia Program, Univ of Pennsylvania, Fall 2010**

[Orbis, Fall 2010 Volume 54, Issue 4, pp. 493-524]

In much of the developing world, the apparent love affair with China likely remains shallow and fragile. The ambiguous and much-debated China Model or Beijing Consensus is only superficially understood and disappointments that would accompany attempted implementation have not yet been encountered. The embrace of China may prove little more than an implicit quid pro quo for diplomatic support, modest development assistance and foreign investment. These are not the most pure or robust forms of soft power. In some cases and on some accounts, they do not even count as soft power.

**CHINA'S ECONOMIC TIES ARE NO THREAT TO THE US**

**Jacques deLisle, director Asia Program, Univ of Pennsylvania, Fall 2010**

[Orbis, Fall 2010 Volume 54, Issue 4, pp. 493-524]

With China's growing economic presence—concentrated in extractive industries, low-end service sectors, and manufactured exports—come looming and already-materializing risks to China's image in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. Complaints of labor abuses, neocolonialism, environmental degradation and hollowing out of labor-intensive local economic sectors have already begun to surface. Nearer China's periphery, economic integration-driven bandwagoning with China is easily exaggerated. As more careful analyses have pointed out, East and Southeast Asian states are wary of China, remain more attracted to U.S. values than PRC ones, and have combined growing links to China with recommitments to ties with the United States through strategies that can be variously—if not wholly satisfactorily—characterized as balancing, double-bandwagoning or hedging.

**AT: CHINA SOFT POWER – NO THREAT TO U.S.**

**CHINA'S SOFT POWER STILL BADLY TRAILS THE US**

**Jacques deLisle, director Asia Program, Univ of Pennsylvania, Fall 2010**

[Orbis, Fall 2010 Volume 54, Issue 4, pp. 493-524]

Throughout much of the non-Western world, seeming Sinophilia is to some extent superficial and self-indulgent tweaking of a sole superpower that is seen as having been on a binge of neglect and abuse. According to major global public opinion surveys and influential Chinese scholars' own estimates, China has scored only limited successes and still badly trails the United States in soft power.

**CHINA'S MODEL HAS LIMITED APPEAL**

**Jacques deLisle, director Asia Program, Univ of Pennsylvania, Fall 2010**

[Orbis, Fall 2010 Volume 54, Issue 4, pp. 493-524]

Third, key types of Chinese soft power resources remain thin. As many analysts at home and abroad have noted, China's political institutions and official values do not enjoy broad appeal, nor does China's record on social equity, the environment, international human rights and other matters. The international relevance, content and even existence of a China Model for development are as much foci of debate as they are rich sources of soft power that can alter foreigners' attitudes and preferences in ways that serve Chinese interests. China's soft power remains heavily statist, lacking the popular culture, commercial and civil society dimensions that provide much of the might of American soft power. A slowing of China's growth rate or rise in its perceived collateral costs is far from unimaginable and would dim the luster of the China Model. Even continued success could sap soft power as a more prosperous China would become, like Taiwan, seemingly less relevant to the developing world.

## **AT: CHINA THREAT – ECONOMIC GROWTH EXAGGERATED**

### **PROJECTIONS OF CHINESE ECONOMIC GROWTH ARE EXAGGERATED**

**Joseph Nye, professor Harvard University, October 2010**

[The Washington Quarterly, Volume 33, Number 4, October 2010, p. 150]

Such projections should be viewed with some skepticism. China still lags far behind the United States economically and militarily, and has focused its policies primarily on its region and on its economic development. Even if China's GDP passes that of the United States around 2027 (as Goldman Sachs projects) the two economies would technically be equivalent in size but not in composition. China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside, and it will begin to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of the one child per couple policy it enforced in the twentieth century.

### **CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE AND INFLUENCE WILL DECLINE**

**Joseph Nye, professor Harvard University, October 2010**

[The Washington Quarterly, Volume 33, Number 4, October 2010, p. 150]

Moreover, as countries develop, there is a tendency for growth rates to slow. Assuming six percent Chinese growth and only two percent American growth after 2030, China would not equal the United States in per capita income until sometime in the second half of the century. Since per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy, aggregate economic size will not necessarily mean that China will economically surpass the United States in 2027. During the past decade, China moved from being the ninth largest exporter to the largest in the world, but China's export-led development model will probably need to be adjusted as global trade and financial balances become more contentious in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. That means that the financial crisis may eventually hurt Chinese power in the medium term by reducing the rest of the world's willingness to effectively allow China to free ride on open global markets without liberalizing its own exchange rates, interest rates, and markets. And although China holds huge foreign currency reserves, China will have difficulty increasing its financial leverage by lending overseas in its own currency until it has a deep and open financial market where interest rates are set by the market and not the government.

## **AT: CHINA THREAT – INTERDEPENDENCE BLOCKS CONFLICT**

### **ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE CHECKS THE CHINESE THREAT**

**Joseph Nye, professor Harvard University, October 2010**

[The Washington Quarterly, Volume 33, Number 4, October 2010, p. 148]

A similar relationship has developed today between the United States and China. The United States accepts Chinese imports, pays China in dollars, and China holds the U.S. dollars and bonds, in effect making a loan to the United States. China has amassed \$2.5 trillion of foreign exchange reserves, much of it held in U.S. Treasury securities. Some observers have described this as a great shift in the global balance of power because China could bring the United States to its knees by threatening to sell its dollars. But in doing so, China would not only reduce the value of its reserves as the price of the dollar fell, but it would also jeopardize U.S. willingness to continue to import cheap Chinese goods, which would mean job loss and instability in China. If it dumped its dollars, China would bring the United States to its knees, but might also bring itself to its ankles.

### **THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE CHECKS CHINA'S ECONOMIC THREAT**

**Joseph Nye, professor Harvard University, October 2010**

[The Washington Quarterly, Volume 33, Number 4, October 2010, p. 149]

Though such changes are not likely to occur quickly, it is interesting to note that the G-20 has agreed that Europe should reduce the weight of its votes in the IMF, and that China and other emerging economies should gradually increase theirs. This again shows the importance of the limitations on economic interdependent power. China could threaten to sell its holdings of dollars and damage the U.S. economy, but a weakened U.S. economy would mean a smaller market for Chinese exports, and the U.S. government might respond with tariffs against Chinese goods. Moreover, as other emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, find their exports hurt by an under-valued Chinese currency, they may use a multilateral forum like the G-20 to reinforce the U.S. position against China.<sup>24</sup> Neither side is in a hurry to break the symmetry of their vulnerability interdependence, but each continues to jockey to shape the structure and institutional framework of their market relationship.

**AT: U.S. LEADERSHIP – NO THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP**

**THE U.S. STILL HAS UNMATCHED PRIMACY**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 54 ]

The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America's next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.

**ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWER ARE NOT LINKED DIRECTLY WITH INFLUENCE AND POWER**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 54 ]

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics.

**AT: U.S. LEADERSHIP – NO THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP**

**AMERICA’S POSITION IN THE WORLD COULD BE STRENGTHENED EVEN AFTER ITS  
DOMINANCE IS REDUCED**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 55 ]

As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

**AMERICAN POWER SHARING IS INEVITABLE, WHAT MATTERS IS HOW THE U.S. ACTS  
DURING THAT TIME**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 68 ]

It still remains inevitable that America’s outsized role in world politics will decline in the years and decades ahead. Rather than seeking to desperately prolong this position at undue expense, which would serve only to hasten America’s decline and weaken its long-term position, the United States should start thinking now about how it will exercise its power and influence once its preeminent position is over. The United States is still in a position to shape this new world order, by defining the rules, institutions, and patterns of legitimacy that will prevail in this new era of global politics. Periods of change in the global distribution of power are often chaotic, unstable, and violent. The United States will be responsible for maintaining some kind of global equilibrium so the end of one era of world politics and the emergence of a new, different era avoids the overt power competition and instability of previous transitions. While the United States will face more constraints and pushback from the rest of the world, it may actually be able to preserve and in some cases even expand its influence in this new era.

**AT: U.S. LEADERSHIP – NO THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP**

**GOVERNMENT POLICIES ARE ONLY A FRACTION OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO A NATION'S LEADERSHIP**

**Joseph Nye, professor Harvard University, October 2010**

[The Washington Quarterly, Volume 33, Number 4, October 2010, p. 146]

Despite being blamed for the financial crisis, U.S. soft power remained greater than that of China as measured by both The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and BBC polls. Great powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their advantage, but much of it is created by civil society rather than government. American soft power rests on a variety of resources that range from Hollywood to Harvard; from Madonna to the Gates Foundation; from Martin Luther King's speeches to Barack Obama's election. It is not easy for governments to sell their country's charm if their narrative is inconsistent with domestic realities. In that dimension, except for its economic success, China still has a long way to go.

**AT: U.S. LEADERSHIP – NO THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP**

**AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE USE OF OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, WILL INCREASINGLY DEPEND ON “SOFT POWER” MECHANISMS – SPACE PROGRAM IRRELEVANT**

**Joseph Nye, Professor of International Relations, Harvard, March 18, 2008**

[[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18173/america\\_must\\_learn\\_the\\_hard\\_facts\\_of\\_soft\\_power.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18173/america_must_learn_the_hard_facts_of_soft_power.html)]

The American presidential race commands attention around the world. The fact that the final three contenders include a woman, an African American, and an older man who often challenged his own party suggests that the United States, after a decline in popularity during the Bush years, retains a capacity to reinvent itself. But the next president must recognise that the nature of leadership is also changing. The information revolution is transforming politics and organisations. People today have become less deferential to authority in organisations and in politics. Soft power — the ability to get what you want by attraction rather than coercion or payment — is becoming more important. Even the military faces these changes. The Pentagon reports that American army drillmasters do "less shouting at everyone", because today's generation responds better to instructors who play "a more counseling-type role". Of course, the hard power of command remains important. Hard and soft power are related, because they are both approaches to achieving one's objectives by affecting the behavior of others. Hard and soft power can reinforce or undermine each other. In response to al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the US, Vice-President Dick Cheney argued that strong military action would deter further attacks. But the indiscriminate use of hard power — illustrated by the invasion of Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prison photos, and detentions without trial — served to increase the number of terrorist recruits. The absence of an effective soft power component undercut the strategic response to terrorism.

**AT: U.S. LEADERSHIP – NO THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP**

**WARS ARE INEVITABLE WITH OR WITHOUT AMERICAN HEGEMONY – AND HEGEMONY ENTAILS STARTING SOME WARS**

**Daniel Larison, PhD University of Chicago, The American Conservative April 5, 2010**

[<http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/04/05/a-bright-post-hegemonic-future/>]

In other words, unsustainable U.S. hegemony will not be as great as it was, and that will mean that other major and rising powers will be able to exert something more like the normal influence in their regions that such powers have exerted throughout most of modern history. Will there be conflicts in such a world? Of course, there will be, but we already have a number of conflicts in the world that have either been deemed irrelevant to the maintenance of Pax Americana or they are the products of policies designed to perpetuate Pax Americana. In practice, securing this “peace” has involved starting several wars, the largest and most destructive of which has been the war in Iraq, as well as supporting proxies and allies as they escalated conflicts with their neighbors.

**CHALLENGES TO THE U.S. ARE INEVITABLE AND MAY EVEN BE CAUSED BY OUR HEGEMONIC POLICIES**

**Daniel Larison, PhD University of Chicago, The American Conservative April 5, 2010**

[<http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/04/05/a-bright-post-hegemonic-future/>]

China will build up its military, as it is already doing, and Russia will continue to extend its influence into its “near-abroad,” and Iran will develop nuclear weapons. What is important to stress here is that all of these things already are or soon will be happening anyway. These things are happening despite, and perhaps in some cases because of, American military presence in their respective regions. The reality of multipolarity makes these first two more or less unavoidable, and as we have been seeing over the last few years there is nothing short of full-scale war with Iran that could realistically interrupt the development of its nuclear program. If Iran definitely decides to acquire nuclear weapons, there is remarkably little that any outside government can do to prevent this from happening. One sure way to guarantee that Iran pursues this route is to continue to act punitively towards Iran. If Western powers actively resist Russian efforts to exercise influence along its own borders as the U.S. and some European states have been doing, all that will result is the use of Russia’s smaller neighbors as Western proxies. This will have very unfortunate consequences for the proxies, which the Russians will intimidate and/or attack and which Western powers will not aid in direct conflicts with Russia.

## **AT: U.S. LEADERSHIP – NO THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP**

### **AMERICAN RELATIVE DECLINE IS INEVITABLE**

**Nina Hachigian, senior fellow, Center for American Progress, 2010**

[[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/american\\_primacy.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/american_primacy.html), Jan 21, 2010]

The truth is that America's *relative* decline is, in fact, unavoidable in the short term. That's just a matter of definition when China's economy is growing at 8 percent or 10 percent, India's at 6 percent, and ours not at all. It won't always be this way, but it is now. Rather than pretending otherwise, the administration is facing and addressing this uncomfortable fact. Because while it is true that our toughest global challenges require cooperation, American power is a vital ingredient to securing the best possible future for Americans.

### **AMERICA IS ALREADY IN RAPID DECLINE DUE TO THE ECONOMY**

**Peter Goodspeed, The National Post, December 23, 2009**

[<http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2379362#ixzz0ajFLkxVK>]

Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, estimates between 2000 and 2008 the US share of the world's GDP fell by 32%, while that of China rose by 144%. 'America is in unprecedented decline,' he says. 'The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell of American hegemony.' The United States has experienced the most significant decline of any state, except the Soviet Union, since the mid-19th century, says Prof. Pape, adding: "Something fundamental has changed."

## **LEADERSHIP TURN – ACCOMMODATION INCREASES LEADERSHIP**

### **ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA AND CHINA’S GREAT POWER STATUS WILL HELP WIN THEIR COOPERATION**

**Deborah Welch Larson, professor political science UCLA, 2010**

[International Security, Spring 2010, Volume 34, Number 4 pp. 63-95]

Securing Chinese and Russian cooperation requires understanding the objectives and logic of their grand strategies and devising effective policies to achieve that goal. In what follows, we demonstrate that despite apparent shifts and turns, Chinese and Russian foreign policies since the end of the Cold War have been motivated by a consistent objective—to restore both countries’ great power status. We argue that China and Russia will be more likely to participate in global governance if the United States can and ways to recognize their distinctive status and identities.

### **STATUS CONCERNS ARE KEY FACTORS IN ENCOURAGING CHINESE COOPERATION**

**Deborah Welch Larson, professor political science UCLA, 2010**

[International Security, Spring 2010, Volume 34, Number 4 pp. 63-95]

In sum, China has increasingly taken on a more activist, constructive world role that includes increased support for multilateralism, a policy that has reassured other states, enhanced China’s global role, and increased its relative status. Nevertheless, the United States must remain attentive to China’s status concerns, because Beijing is increasingly sensitive about its relative position and role in international gatherings such as the newly important G-20 and to the U.S. naval presence in Chinese coastal waters, claiming the area as part of its sphere of influence.

### **U.S. CONTAINMENT AND RIVALRY STRATEGIES WILL FAIL TO ACHIEVE RUSSIA AND CHINA COOPERATION**

**Deborah Welch Larson, professor political science UCLA, 2010**

[International Security, Spring 2010, Volume 34, Number 4 pp. 63-95]

The policy implications of SIT include greater emphasis on status-enhancing actions—for example, formal summits, strategic dialogues, and strategic partnerships—than on conventional prescriptions for containment, integration, or engagement. Because of their need for distinctive identities, rising states should be admitted to international institutions and informal coalitions without being subjected to ideological criteria. As the U.S. ability to achieve its goals unilaterally declines, the United States must learn how to treat China and Russia in ways other than as rivals or junior partners if it is to obtain their cooperation.

**LEADERSHIP TURN – ACCOMMODATION INCREASES LEADERSHIP**

**COOPERATION MUST EXPAND BEYOND THAT WITH OUR ALLIES**

**Yasuhito Fukushima, National Institute for Defense Studies, January 2011**

[Space Policy, volume 27 pp. 3-6]

The Obama NSP clearly recognizes that international cooperation is vital in addressing these challenges. It states that not only the USA but other countries also share the responsibility and “calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space.” Also, the section on international cooperation in the inter-sectoral guidelines specifies that the USA will pursue bilateral and multilateral TCBMs “to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space.” Now it is increasingly important for the USA to go beyond its traditional cooperation with allies and partners, and to expand cooperation with virtually all nations. Thus, the Obama administration sees international cooperation as a “key cornerstone” of its NSP not only to take advantage of growing opportunities, but also to maintain both US primacy in space, and the safety and security of space. For the USA now, international cooperation has been evolving from “nice to do” to “must do” status.

## **CHINESE INSECURITY – THE PLAN PROVOKES CHINA**

### **CHINA VIEWS THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM AS A HUGE MILITARY THREAT**

**Michael Chase, The Jamestown Foundation, March 25, 2011**

[[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=37699&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=25&cHash=e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37699&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244)]

A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as inherently threatening to China's interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weapons in, or from, space to establish global superiority". Similarly, according to Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA's Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others". Given that China must protect its own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes".

### **PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN MILITARIZATION OF SPACE IS A MAJOR MOTIVATING FACTOR FOR CHINA**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.318]

This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force's (PLAAF) new doctrines.

## **CHINESE INSECURITY – THE PLAN PROVOKES CHINA**

### **THE SPACE RACE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE U.S. IS A CLASSIC SECURITY DILEMMA**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.312]

China's interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world order, "the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on." The military space relationship between China and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space warfare reflects China's response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered American suspicion about China's military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. "have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or activity."

### **CHINA'S MOVES INTO SPACE ARE RESPONSES TO U.S. MILITARY POWER**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.313]

This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major factors contributing to the security dilemma that is driving China's military space program. The first is China's attempt to respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space. Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S. military's plan to achieve so-called full-spectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that dominance. The second factor is China's concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably compromise China's offensive nuclear forces. China's response is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the integration of nuclear war and space warfare capabilities.

## **CHINESE INSECURITY – THE PLAN PROVOKES CHINA**

### **CHINA SEES U.S. ACTIONS IN SPACE AS THREATENING DETERRENCE**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.314]

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China's asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional advantages, this article suggests that China's military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing military capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neutralize China's nuclear deterrence. In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks "absolute security" in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats. This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country's efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for "absolute security" evokes countermeasures from other countries.

### **CHINA'S SPACE PROGRAM AIMS TO COUNTERACT U.S. SPACE DOMINANCE**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.316]

Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China's national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for "absolute security" jeopardizes other countries' security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, "In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord."

### **CHINA FEARS THE U.S. IS DEVELOPING SPACE-BASED WEAPONS**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.317]

One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: "Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons."

**CHINESE INSECURITY – PROVOKING CHINA IS DANGEROUS**

**URNS THE CASE**

**CONFRONTATIONAL AMERICAN POLICIES WILL STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY DILEMMA**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34, number 1, Winter 2011 p. 25]

This would suggest, prima facie, that the United States must respond to a realist China with realist methods: by forward-deploying a strong military in the Western Pacific, “strategic hedging” with strengthened alliances and security partnerships all around China’s periphery, levying tough economic and trade policies, leveraging U.S. power and instruments of diplomacy, and reducing expectations of Chinese cooperation on global issues. There is some logic and much temptation to counter China in these ways. But a realist response will only contribute to an inexorable action-reaction cycle, fueling the already extant security dilemma in U.S. —China relations, and could produce an adversarial relationship that neither side needs or seeks. Tough U.S. policies will only bolster Chinese nationalism, rigidify Chinese obstinance, focus Beijing to build up its hard power even more, and make it increasingly difficult to cooperate with China internationally.

## **CHINESE INSECURITY – PROVOKING CHINA IS DANGEROUS**

### **SECURITIZING IMPACT – MILITARIZATION OF CHINA'S SPACE PROGRAM IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE**

#### **MISCALCULATION RISK IS HIGHER IF PLA IS AT THE CENTER OF DECISION MAKING**

**Bruce MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, May 11, 2011**

[Testimony for the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

One characteristic of too many wars in the last century is that they are the result of miscalculation that ignites the tinder of fundamental geopolitical tensions. Averting major power conflict requires skillful management of tensions by senior leaders of the major powers. China has become much more internationally sophisticated, though with important exceptions, in its dealings with the rest of the world than has been true in the past, and this is reflected in its civilian leadership. Unfortunately, the PLA's senior officer corps trails its civilian counterparts in this respect. They have much less interaction with foreign official and travel abroad much less frequently than their U.S. counterparts. This means that the PLA overall views world events from a less knowledgeable and sophisticated perspective, a danger in this increasingly complex world, and could explain, for example, the political "tone-deafness" of the PLA in the manner they conducted their 2007 ASAT test.

#### **CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT CHECKS ON PLA ARE LIMITED IN A CRISIS**

**Bruce MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, May 11, 2011**

[Testimony for the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

This PLA problem becomes more serious when one realizes that the PLA is organizationally separate from the rest of the Chinese government, and reports only to the Central Military Commission, currently chaired by President Hu Jintao. President Hu, and his likely successors, have no significant military background, and the majority of the CMC's members are top PLA officers, suggesting that civilian oversight of major military decisions and consideration of their larger implications are not as carefully reviewed as in the U.S. government. Normally this would not be too great a concern, but in a crisis this could be dangerous.

## **CHINESE INSECURITY – PROVOKING CHINA IS DANGEROUS**

### **IMPACT – MISCALCULATION**

#### **SPACE ASSETS ARE THE KEY TO U.S. MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND LIKELY A CATALYST FOR CRISIS**

**Bruce MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, May 11, 2011**

[Testimony for the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

Space assets, and the communications and cyber links that enable them to function, are the means by which essential national security information is either generated, transmitted, or both. This information is the lifeblood of U.S. conventional military superiority and plays a key role in U.S. strategic nuclear posture as well. As such, these space related assets represent extraordinarily appealing targets in any future conflict, and their relative vulnerability can provide dangerously attractive incentives in a crisis to pre-empt, escalating to war. Resisting this temptation to attack may be morally virtuous but could be strategically unwise: going first in a space conflict with a near-peer space adversary appears to offer many advantages, while absorbing such a strike, with all its attendant destruction of military capabilities, and then responding to the attack against an opponent fully expecting such a response, appears to be militarily and strategically quite undesirable.

### **U.S. EFFORTS FOR SPACE DOMINATION COULD PROMOTE MISCALCULATION**

**Bruce MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace, May 11, 2011**

[Testimony for the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

Creating a stable space domain requires the United States to respond to space threats in a responsible manner, one that ideally does not prod other nations to greater counterspace efforts than they would otherwise pursue. If not careful, the United States could create a self-fulfilling prophecy as nations like China or Russia would see evidence of U.S. attempted space hegemony, they likely would accelerate their own efforts, just as we would if the roles were reversed. China faces the same challenge as well. We should not seek offensive counterspace capability at the expense of effective steps to protect U.S. space capabilities; both can be accommodated.

**CHINESE INSECURITY – PROVOKING CHINA IS DANGEROUS**

**IMPACT – PREVENTS SPACE ARMS CONTROL**

**THE SECURITY DILEMMA PREVENTS ANY EASY SOLUTION TO THE SPACE RACE**

**Baohui Zhang, Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan Univ, Feb. 2011**

[Asian Survey, vol. 51, number 2, p.322]

Christopher Griffin and Joseph Lin also suggest that the prospect of an emerging space arms race “has no easy solution.” They argue that because “the militarization of space inspires the most revisionist elements of the Chinese strategy,” the U.S. must prepare to win the space arms race. In fact, as Johnson-Freese points out, “There are some in the U.S. with a ‘bring it on’ attitude toward a space arms race. These advocates seem to believe that the U.S. can outspend China, forcing the People’s Republic into a spending race reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s doomed attempt to compete with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).” In particular, after China’s 2007 ASAT experiment, Republican Senator Jon Kyl called for immediate funding for a space-based test bed for both kinetic and directed-energy weapons to destroy missiles in their boost phase.

## **U.S. LEADERSHIP TURNS**

### **BEING SO FAR AHEAD INTERNATIONALLY ACTUALLY CAUSES RESENTMENT OF THE U.S.**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 55 ]

Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries' own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics.

### **PREEMINENCE CAN LEAD TO OVEREXTENSION**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 60 ]

There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.<sup>14</sup> The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers' control.

## U.S. LEADERSHIP TURNS

### **PREEMINENCE CAUSES THE U.S. TO EXAGGERATE ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE WORLD**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 61 ]

Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one's role and purpose in world politics.

### **PREEMINENCE LEADS STATES TO DIVERT THEIR ATTENTION FROM PRIORITIES**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 61 ]

Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe.

## **U.S. LEADERSHIP TURNS**

### **PURSUIT OF PREMINENCE CAUSES ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH REDUCES OUR INFLUENCE**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 63 ]

It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise to anti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms. It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in the missteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one's own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States. Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes.

### **PRIMACY IS REALLY THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE OTHERS**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 57 ]

Primacy: The Ability to Influence Outcomes. The other way to think about power is the ability to realize one's own preferences or preferred outcomes, or the ability to influence other actors—usually other states but not always—to do what you want them to do. When we think of power this way, we realize that the United States' vast resources alone often are not sufficient to realize its preferred ends. There is no perfect correlation between the resources at one's command and the ability to realize preferred outcomes. Perhaps no other period of world politics in recent memory represents this discrepancy more acutely than today. U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other state. Politically, diplomatically, and economically the United States remains in a preeminent position. While it hardly gets everything it wants, no other country can match U.S. influence in these realms. At the same time, from Iran, to North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not to mention Russia and China, the United States is seemingly not getting its way on issues central to its interests. More states are unafraid to challenge the United States (if only at the margins), ignore its blandishments, or seek to decrease their reliance or dependence on American security guarantees.

## **U.S. LEADERSHIP TURNS**

### **NEW GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES COULD TIGHTEN AMERICAN ALLIANCES**

**Richard Maher, PhD. candidate, Brown University, ORBIS, March 2011**

[ORBIS, Winter 2011 Volume 55, Issue 1 p. 64 ]

It is counterintuitive to think that America's unprecedented power decreases its allies' dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America's allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia's reemergence could unnerve America's European allies, just as China's continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America's allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

## **CHINESE LEADERSHIP TURN - LINK**

### **HARSH ACTIONS BY THE U.S. WILL STRENGTHEN THE HARD LINE ELEMENTS IN CHINA**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34. number 1, Winter 2011 p. 23]

Collectively, these schools of thoughts also have policy implications. The international community must grasp that China's international identity is not fixed. It is fluid and a work-in-progress that remains contentious and constantly debated. As such, the United States and others can influence the ongoing debates (as well as policy outcomes) through both actions and words, both negatively and positively. Harsh words and tough actions from the United States are likely to have a reinforcing effect on China, producing more truculent and troubling behavior from Beijing as domestic voices push the government to stand firm against Washington.

### **CHINA'S SUCCESSFUL SPACE PROGRAM LEGITIMIZES THEIR SOCIETY**

**Everett Dolman, prof., Comparative Military Studies, US Air Force, September 2010**

[The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment, September 2010, p. 4]

China's current space program is readily imagined as a New Age Great Wall. Competing with the West in the highest technological endeavors, and doing so despite significant capital disparities, enhances the legitimacy of the communist party. China's domestic population rationalizes lower per capita income as the state completes its rise among nations to superpower status. International audiences are awed by the accomplishments, conveying further legitimacy to the state. They acknowledge China's domestic right to self-determination, but more importantly give credence to the capacity of Chinese manufacturing to produce quality high technology goods. This perception helps to increase the sale of advanced Chinese-made products abroad.

### **THERE IS NO ONE VIEW INSIDE CHINA – THERE ARE MANY FORCES COMPETING FOR INFLUENCE – AND THEY REACT TO SLIGHTS WITH NATIONALISM**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34. number 1, Winter 2011 p. 21]

This is the spectrum of elite opinion in China today about its international role. The fact that China has such a diverse discourse suggests that it possesses multiple international identities and a schizophrenic personality. This discourse also says nothing about China's millions of netizens in cyberspace who are extremely vocal, active, and squarely in the Nativists' camp. The Chinese government is quite sensitive to this body of public opinion, as much of it is hyper-nationalistic and critical of the government for being "weak" or "soft" in the face of foreign pressures and indignities. Foreign Ministry officials are quick to point out that this is a constituency they must constantly consider, react to, and attempt to control. This mass nationalism only reinforces the Nativist — Realist center of gravity among the elite.

## **CHINESE LEADERSHIP TURN - UNIQUENESS**

### **CHINA'S CONSERVATIVE LEADERS ARE IN CONTROL NOW BUT THAT COULD CHANGE**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34. number 1, Winter 2011 p. 7]

What the world is witnessing in China's new posture is in part the product of an ongoing intensive internal debate, and represents a current consensus among the more conservative and nationalist elements to toughen its policies and selectively throw China's weight around. Although there seems to be domestic agreement at present, China remains a deeply conflicted rising power with a series of competing international identities. Many new voices and actors are now part of an unprecedentedly complex foreign-policy-making process.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, China's foreign policy often exhibits diverse and contradictory emphases. Understanding these competing identities is crucial to anticipating how Beijing's increasingly contradictory and multidimensional behavior will play out on the world stage. Each orientation carries different policy implications for the United States and other nations.

### **CHINA'S LEADERS USE A REALIST FRAMEWORK**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34. number 1, Winter 2011 p. 12]

China's "Realists" are the dominant group in the discourse on international relations and China's global role today (if not forever). Realism has had deep roots in China's intellectual worldview for several centuries,<sup>12</sup> even during the country's socialist era. Chinese Realists take the nation-state as their core unit of analysis, uphold the principle of state sovereignty above all else, and reject arguments that transnational issues penetrate across borders. Like realists elsewhere, they tend to see the international environment as anarchic and unpredictable, thus placing a premium on building up a strong state that can navigate its own way in the world and resist outside pressures.

## **CHINESE LEADERSHIP TURN - UNIQUENESS**

### **CHINESE REALISTS ARE IN TWO SCHOOLS, ONE AGGRESSIVE THE OTHER DEFENSIVE**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34. number 1, Winter 2011 p. 12]

China's Realists may be sub-divided into "offensive" and "defensive," as well as "hard" and "soft," camps. Each strand believes that the state has to build its own strength, but what distinguishes them is the purposes for which the state uses its power. Hard-power realists argue for strengthening comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli) particularly the military and economic dimensions while soft-power realism emphasizes diplomacy and cultural power. The offensive realists argue that China should use its newly-built military, economic, and diplomatic influence to essentially coerce others toward the ends China desires. They believe that power is worth little if it is not used. In their minds, China should, for example, leverage its holding of U.S. treasury bonds to get Washington to stop selling arms to Taiwan, or penalize large U.S. corporations for selling weapons to Taipei. They would like China to establish a much broader military (particularly naval) presence in the western Pacific to force the United States to stop operating close to China's coastline. Defensive realists agree that China should possess strong military might, but should "keep its powder dry" and use it essentially to deter aggression and Taiwanese independence.

### **A MAJORITY OF CHINA'S SENIOR POLICYMAKERS ARE PRAGMATIC**

**David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, GWU, Winter, 2011**

[Washington Quarterly, volume 34. number 1, Winter 2011 p. 15]

Although scholars and pundits debate the wisdom of a major-power orientation, they point out that the majority of senior Chinese leaders and policymakers are pragmatic about China's national needs and interests and thus still adopt a major-power orientation. Their logic is that it would be too costly for China to have strained ties with any of the three major powers noted above.

## **AT: CHINESE SOFT POWER**

### **REPRESSIVE SOCIETY DOOMS CHINESE SOFT POWER**

**Johan Lagerkvist, senior research fellow, Swedish Inst. of International Affairs, 3.23.11**

[<http://johanlagerkvist.org/2011/03/23/the-coming-collapse-of-chinas-soft-power/>]

The stability-overrides-everything principle will eventually erode soft power among important elite groups inside China too. Foreign businesses, expats, Chinese scholars, domestic businesses, and young Internet users will complain that the Chinese government's Internet censorship is going too far. Recently, the filtering of emails, SMS, and blocking of VPN-services used by many companies, foreigners, and Chinese academics to get around the Great Chinese firewall of censorship have become a huge irritant. The zero tolerance of any voices susceptible to political mobilization and organizing slows Internet connections and crucial information sharing between foreign and Chinese markets and people. And this in a period when Chinese social protest is not likely to erupt on a scale like that in North Africa and the Middle East.

### **THE HARD-LINE CHINESE LEADERS DON'T VALUE SOFT POWER**

**Johan Lagerkvist, senior research fellow, Swedish Inst. of International Affairs, 3.23.11**

[<http://johanlagerkvist.org/2011/03/23/the-coming-collapse-of-chinas-soft-power/>]

China's internal stability/security and survival of the Communist Party will always be more important to China's leaders than the image it projects for outside consumption. Pouring money into Chinese equivalents to CNN and Al-Jazeera won't help as long as these two pillars remain bottom-line for all reform initiatives. Moreover, the hardliners in the Chinese media system, especially in the Central Propaganda Department have marginalized the soft liners. This has led to a backlash against an at times visible trend toward more objective information, which is qualitatively different from raw propaganda.

### **CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS LIMIT THEIR SOFT POWER EFFECTIVENESS**

**Johan Lagerkvist, senior research fellow, Swedish Inst. of International Affairs, 3.23.11**

[<http://johanlagerkvist.org/2011/03/23/the-coming-collapse-of-chinas-soft-power/>]

Foreigners know that China's political system is undemocratic and all sorts of power abuse and human rights atrocities are common. And contrary to some beliefs, these views are common in the developing countries of the global South as well. No soft power program in the world can cloak or positively defend the defects of the Chinese political system. Yet, even if these defects were ameliorated in earnest and rule of law was actually implemented beyond lofty Communist Party rhetoric, suspicion and disbelief would still linger.

## **AT: CHINESE SOFT POWER**

### **CHINA'S NEW ASSERTIVENESS HURTS THEIR SOFT POWER**

**Johan Lagerkvist, senior research fellow, Swedish Inst. of International Affairs, 3.23.11**

[<http://johanlagerkvist.org/2011/03/23/the-coming-collapse-of-chinas-soft-power/>]

A new Chinese assertiveness vis-à-vis neighbors Japan, South Korea, India, and ASEAN countries in its foreign policy behavior during 2010 indicated a new posture, or rather an older Chinese stance predating the previously skillful regional diplomacy of “good neighborliness.” With the statement that the South China Sea was a “core interest” area of China on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the good neighbor atmosphere deteriorated fast, prompting ASEAN countries so seek US support for their security arrangements – in the light of China’s potentially “unpeaceful rise.” Needless to say, this new assertiveness of China has not gone unnoticed in other parts of the world.

## **SOLVENCY: CHINA WON'T QUIT ITS SPACE PROGRAM**

### **AS CHINA'S SPACE PROGRAM GROWS IT WILL HELP ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

**Alanna Krolikowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2001**

[Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

Today, the broadening and maturing space program more directly serves specific economic development goals. An important recent change in the relationship of the space sector to the rest of the economy is growth in the usage of space-derived products and services. New indigenously supplied space products and services and new users have emerged. Some of the most rapidly growing new applications are in remote sensing for mapping and surveying, natural-resource management, and urban planning, satellite navigation, weather forecasting, and disaster monitoring and mitigation.

### **SPACE IS BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT IN CHINA AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET**

**Alanna Krolikowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2001**

[Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

The main users of space-derived data are still primarily central government agencies and large state-owned enterprises,<sup>3</sup> but local and provincial governments and small and medium enterprises are increasingly important. One source reports over 20,000 companies in the surveying and mapping industry alone.<sup>4</sup> Multiple levels of government also participate in large-scale space-related infrastructure projects such as the Digital China Geospatial Network, an initiative that will eventually deliver space-derived data to the public. The implications of this usage and user growth for economic development are that the space program today has more stakeholders and can be used to advance more policy agendas and commercial interests than ever before. Space is gradually becoming embedded across China's economy and governance structures.

### **CHINA USES SPACE TO DEVELOP EXPORT MARKETS GLOBALLY**

**Alanna Krolikowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2001**

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Developing markets occupy an important place in the Chinese space industry's export strategy. The Chinese government and space industry have taken note of the growing demand for space products and services in developing markets. Within the past five years, China has reached agreements to export or effectively donate satellites or launch services to Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia, Laos, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Venezuela. These transactions were not internationally competed sales. Excluded from important global space markets by restrictions on U.S. technology exports, the Chinese space industry finds opportunities in developing countries that are subject to restrictions similar to those imposed on China. Venezuela and Pakistan are examples of this type of market.

## **SOLVENCY: CHINA WON'T QUIT ITS SPACE PROGRAM**

### **CHINA IS INCREASING THEIR SATELLITE SERVICES SALES WORLDWIDE**

**Alanna Krolikowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2001**

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China's approach to space exports also leverages its firms' and government's unique advantage at operating in developing-world markets. Chinese satellite manufacturers are in a position to offer generous terms to buyers in developing countries, for whom price can be a decisive factor. Offering concessional financing terms, providing development assistance (formally or informally) tied to satellite purchases, and even accepting payment for satellites in barter has made it possible for China to create buyers of satellites where none previously existed. These arrangements are made easier by the fact that many buyers in developing countries are governments or state-owned enterprises like their Chinese counterparts.

## **SOLVENCY: CHINA WON'T QUIT ITS SPACE PROGRAM**

### **CHINA SEES ITS SPACE PROGRAM AS IMPORTANT FOR ITS GREAT POWER STATUS AND PEACEFUL RISE**

**Alanna Krolkowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2001**

[Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,  
[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written\\_testimonies/hr11\\_05\\_11.php](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/hr11_05_11.php)]

Chinese leaders and policymakers emphasize the need to foster international attitudes and institutions that are supportive of their country's peaceful economic rise. The space program serves this end by reinforcing China's position as a capable party requiring inclusion in major international processes affecting space and by enhancing its influence in the developing world. Conspicuous and autonomous achievements in space also reinforce China's great power status and its membership in the elite club of advanced spacefaring countries. Chinese leaders emphasize the growing importance of space in international and security affairs and in the global economy. Regarding assured access to space as both an economic and national security interest, they fear exclusion from any international process that bears upon how space could be used in the future. Achieving significant space capabilities ensures that China will have a "seat at the table" when decisions about space are made.

### **CHINA'S SPACE PROGRAM IS INCREASINGLY TIED TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

**Alanna Krolkowski, Visiting Scholar, Space Policy Institute, GW Univ., May 11, 2001**

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Another industrial strategy for the space sector is also taking shape. Central, provincial, and local governments are investing in several space-technology industrial hubs near major historical centers of aerospace research, development, and production across the country. These efforts will leverage existing local competencies to create economies of agglomeration and clusters of networked expertise, conditions usually regarded as conducive to innovation, firm specialization, and small-business development in the lower tiers of high-technology industries. In addition, China is entering a phase of space-sector development during which even greater emphasis is placed on the commercialization of space technology. A policy priority during this time is making space more relevant to lives of ordinary people and increasing domestic demand for space-related goods and services.